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Total	Gamification
Mathias Fuchs
When a former US vice president calls games “normal”, it is most 
likely that the medium he is talking about has lost its innocence. 
Al Gore’s statement that “games are the new normal” (2011) 
indicates that the early days when games were new and nice, 
harmless, or neat and niche, are gone. Games have had their 
coming of age and the days of ludic infancy are long since past. 
Through the maturation of games as a medium, we have realised 
they can serve a purpose and have lost their naïveté. Games 
can simulate battlefields, games can predict disaster, they can 
increase profit, and they can crunch markets. On their way to 
maturity games have lost their enchanting non­intentionality. 
The original naïveté of being good for nothing but play has 
vanished into thin air. It has, however, been replaced by a second 
order naïveté: the interests of games are no longer challenged.1 
Nobody would call a game “corrupted” (Caillois 1958) if money 
was involved in the gameplay. There are also no taboo areas 
for gaming. Gaming scenarios include warfare, pornography, 
financial transactions, espionage and counter­espionage, 
theft and antisocial behaviour. Welcome to the days of total 
gamification!
What we experience today is a diversity of play and the ubiquity 
of games, making them not only a popular medium but also a 
key medium and probably the leading medium of contemporary 
society.
The coverage of games across media sectors and social niches 
also makes them a super­medium, a medium that can easily 
adopt the styles and modes of predecessor media. Games can 
cannibalise sister media and pretend to be film, radio, narration, 
1 I pick up an idea here that Adorno formulated in regard to art and its lost 
“naïveté” (Adorno 2004, 3).
8 performance or sculpture. Games can adopt genres, or mas­
querade as medieval, futuristic, elegant, brutal or Gothic. In this 
book Tanya Krzywinska casts a critical glance upon the pleasure 
that Gothic forms invoke, and investigates the horror games sub­
culture, a segment that amounts to 20 percent of digital games. 
Markus Rautzenberg (this volume) describes video games as 
“an explorable universal metaphor of the digital medium” and 
points out that we “look through” games to see content without 
realising that it is the medium we are looking at while at the 
same time we acknowledge an indispensable distance from the 
medium. On one hand we can explore simulated worlds without 
being distracted by pixelation or other display peculiarities, but 
on the other hand an “uncertainty” still remains about whether 
we are inside the medium or outside (Rautzenberg, this volume). 
Our contemporary perception differs from how we experienced 
games in the days of eight­bit computing: a pixelated view 
guaranteed a permanent distance from the medium. It can be 
demonstrated in many instances that distance from a medium 
accompanies the reception of that medium in its early stages. 
Irony, laughter and mockery are fuelled by the artefacts, the 
glitches and the distortions that media, in their infancy, initially 
produce in abundance. This was the case for the car with its 
“horse­carriageness”, for early radio with its crackle and hiss, and 
for television with the constraint of 625 horizontal scan lines and 
half­images.2 Mature media lose their obvious mediality. Games 
have grown up and today we consider them “normal” in a way 
that is not unlike the “normality” of television in the 1960s and 
‘70s. 
Astrid Ensslin (2015) looks at the ubiquity and normality of games 
when she states that she is: 
Not sure whether you can say that (print!) literature was 
ever as popular and all­pervasive as games are nowadays. 
Of course there’s still the digital divide, but even before 
2 This is the case for most PAL television format variants.
9radio, television and film came to be mass media, literature 
never had the kind of “mass effect” and the kind of creative, 
user­driven popular culture that games have today – due to 
low literacy levels and social discrimination in centuries past. 
Perhaps you could say that games (and particularly mobile 
games) are the new television. (Ensslin 2015)
Very much like television was a conditio sine qua non in the ‘50s, 
games are a must­have now. Today’s grandparents have to pos­
sess skills in Angry Birds (2009) to demonstrate they are cool – and 
schoolchildren have to be able to cope with gamified learning 
apps to prove they are clever. Firefighters need serious games 
to learn how to extinguish fires and the terminally ill have to 
keep playing to stay in shape. There is hardly a social group or a 
niche within a population that can do without games. Maybe the 
insane. But then this only proves what Al Gore told us. If “games 
are the new normal”, then only those who are not normal will not 
play them. 
Seriousness as a Problem
When games started to be considered as being “serious” at least 
one of two essential sources of resistance3 against the false 
notion of a whole, all­encompassing, eco­sociological system 
became apparent: Games could no longer claim a “resistant” 
distance to empirical reality. Serious games, on the contrary, 
increasingly mingled with empirical reality and with the “regime 
of representation” in a way that was unprecedented. For years, 
children have been playing doctors and nurses or soldiers and 
police, but never before have games been declared medically 
effective or been applied to organise battlefield operations. The 
success of gamification and serious games established a deep 
belief in the paradoxical notion of serious play and the equally 
3 Rancière speaks of the regime of representation and of the aesthetic regime 
(Rancière 2008, 15–17).
10 surprising concept of games in “non­gaming contexts”. The 
evangelists of gamification proclaimed that everybody could live 
longer by playing computer games (MacGonigal 2011) or that there 
would be “fun ways to cure cancer” (Scott 2013). An appreciation 
of statements like these necessitates a liaison between the ludic 
and empirical reality, and results in a state where “real life is 
becoming indistinguishable from computer games” to paraphrase 
a famous statement from Horkheimer and Adorno about movies 
(Adorno and Horkheimer 1993).
From Friedrich Schiller to Al Gore
Al Gore’s before mentioned declaration of the normality of 
computer games is rooted in a philosophical tradition that tries to 
enoble playfulness as a universal source, medium or pharmakon 
of culture (Huizinga 1938). Friedrich Schiller’s claim about humans 
being human only when playing4 neglects non­ludic activities of 
men and women that constitute the human “in the fullest sense 
of the word” (Schiller 2013). To be able to work, sleep, love and 
hate without any playfulness in mind makes humans human. 
The inevitability of dying and the uncertainty about the time of 
death constitute humans in the fullest sense of the word as well. 
Markus Rautzenberg (this volume) refers to Jacques Lacan when 
he points out that it is not of course “uncertain if we die or not 
but that we live as if that was the case”. Play might create situ­
ations that suggest certainty, but only within de facto uncertainty. 
This becomes apparent in the experiments on confidence, trust 
and unconsciousness that Karen Palmer stages brilliantly in 
her ludic performance SYNCSELF 2 (2014). The parkour runner is 
challenged by uncertainty about the success of the next leap he 
or she is going to undertake. Will the concrete wall he or she is 
4 “For, to speak out once for all, man only plays when in the full meaning of the 
word he is a man, and he is only completely a man when he plays” (Schiller 
2013).
11trying to reach crumble? Will he or she slip because of unforeseen 
moisture on the ground? Will a sudden gust of wind change the 
direction of the leap by a few crucial millimeters? The physical 
environment that parkour runners are acting in is loaded with 
uncertainty and with true randomness that a computer game is 
incapable of providing. Of course, the consequences of failing 
are of a different nature in the concrete (in both meanings of 
the word) world of parkour and the simulated physicality of 
worlds like the ones we know from Assassin’s Creed (2007) and 
the like. The way the runner can accomplish a subjective feeling 
of certainty about his or her leap is by “framing the uncertainty” 
(Rautzenberg, this volume) as a game.
I wouldn’t go as far as Espen Aarseth when, in an interview once, 
he stated that the only two conditions that could not be played 
are sleeping and dying (Aarseth 2009). I would contend that 
labour is another other human condition that cannot be played. 
I can of course imitate actions that are reminiscent of work and 
play a game of mimicry (Caillois 1958). But this does not play 
labour. Bataille states that the regime of labour denies play, and 
Robert Pfaller’s reading of Bataille comes to the conclusion that 
“it does not do so by chance, it is the very nature of labour to 
be the negative of play“ (Pfaller 2010, 20). Hammering on rocks 
on a theatre stage is therefore just a game about work­related 
symptoms, but it is not playing work at a substantial level.
For the idealist philosophy of Schiller, death and labour did 
of course matter less than beauty (Schönheit) and living form 
(lebende Gestalt). In the fifteenth letter on aesthetic education, 
Schiller suggests to closely relate “real and existing beauty” with 
the “real and existing drive for play” and goes as far as saying 
that the “ideal of beauty” dictates the “ideal of play” (Schiller 
2013, 62). According to Schiller play has to be noble, bloodless and 
appreciable.
We can immediately understand why the ideal form of a 
Venus, of a Juno, and of an Apollo, is to be sought not at 
12 Rome, but in Greece, if we contrast the Greek population, 
delighting in the bloodless athletic contests of boxing, racing, 
and intellectual rivalry at Olympia, with the Roman people 
gloating over the agony of a gladiator.5 (Schiller 2013, 62) 
Obviously for Schiller there are good games and bad games!
What Schiller tries to accomplish in his Letters on Aesthetic Edu-
cation (1795) is to declare play as the essential super­category 
encompassing and harmonising life and form. Life, according 
to Schiller, is the object of the sensual, bodily drives.6 Gestalt is 
the object of the drive for form.7 Both of those, the sensual drive 
and the form drive, exclude each other. That is why Schiller is 
searching for another drive, that he calls Spieltrieb (play drive) to 
aim at objects that could be labelled “lebende Gestalt”, or “living 
form” (Schiller 2013, 58). Why? 
There shall be a communion between the formal impulse 
and the material impulse – that is, there shall be a play 
instinct – because it is only the unity of reality with the form, 
of the accidental with the necessary, of the passive state with 
freedom, that the conception of humanity is completed.8 
(Schiller 2013, 59)
5 German original: “Wenn sich die griechischen Völkerschaften in den 
Kampfspielen zu Olympia an den unblutigen Wettkämpfen der Kraft, der 
Schnelligkeit, der Gelenkigkeit und an dem edlern Wechselstreit der Talente 
ergötzen, und wenn das römische Volk an dem Todeskampf eines erlegten 
Gladiators oder seines lybischen Gegners sich labt, so wird aus diesem Zuge 
begreiflich, warum wir die Idealgestalten einer Venus, einer Juno, eines Apoll 
nicht in Rom, sondern in Griechenland suchen müssen” (Schiller 2013, 62).
6 German original: “Der Gegenstand des sinnlichen Triebes, in einem all­
gemeinen Begriff ausgedrückt, heißt Leben” (Schiller 2013, 58).
7 German original: “Der Gegenstand des Formtriebes, in einem allgemeinen 
Begriff ausgedrückt, heißt Gestalt” (Schiller 2013, 58).
8 German original: “Es soll eine Gemeinschaft zwischen Formtrieb und Stoff­
trieb, das heißt, ein Spieltrieb seyn, weil nur die Einheit der Realität mit der 
Form, der Zufälligkeit mit der Nothwendigkeit , des Leidens mit der Freyheit 
den Begriff der Menschheit vollendet” (Schiller 2013, 59).
13Note the language. Schiller does not say that there is a unity 
of gestalt and life. He proclaims instead: “There shall be a 
communion between the formal impulse and the material 
impulse”. Play and the play drive are constructed in order to 
optimise the ideal of humanity. That is why idealised play has to 
become normal and corrupted play (for example, the Romans 
and their Circus Maximus) or non­play has to be relegated to a 
second­class activity. It took some 230 years for Al Gore to arrive 
at a similar proposition: games are the new normal. Implicitly 
they are declared to be of prime importance and to be the only 
important human occupation.
From Diversity to Totality
The diversification of games can be seen as the maturing of the 
medium. The popularity of games has increased dramatically, 
games have become much more diverse and gaming is taking 
place in a wide range of practices, from e­sport to gamification. 
In addition, the gamer position includes a number of roles and 
identities such as: players, learners, time­fillers, users, fans, 
roleplayers, theory crafters, speed runners, and many more. 
Yet, the integration of games into everyday life absorbs the 
variety that once constituted the medium’s strength. The more 
advanced the integration the more it turns into a mere spinning 
of gears. One might argue that the extension of play into all kinds 
of non­gaming contexts leads to an over­accumulation of play.9 
This is to suggest that play loses its liberating dynamics and 
becomes characterised by a quantitative increase of games and 
gaming, to a point of saturation. A situation could arise where 
the system’s capacity to cope with further increase of playful­
ness is exhausted. This might lead to a qualitative leap that turns 
diversity into totality, and free play into total play. As a perversion 
9 Schell used to call the over­accumulation “over­gamification” in his talk at 
the DICE summit in 2010 where he sketches an Orwellian scenario (Schell 
2010).
14 of the original play drive that is sensuous, liberating and free, a 
model of total gamification could be prefigured by a conception 
of games as the new normal and in which games are the only 
normal. Exclusive normality leads to totality. Total gamification 
would describe a situation where all human and technical 
resources have to be gamified. In regards to human resources we 
are already facing a situation where the old and the young, men 
and women, various ethnic groups and a huge reserve army of 
minorities and niche populations are drawn into gaming arenas. 
The main games industries work with their brothers in arms of 
the indie games industry to incessantly recruit new audiences: 
the homeless, black teenage mums, those with depression or 
Alzheimer’s. But also on a technical level total Gamification takes 
its toll. In his essay “Gamification as the Post-Modern Phalanstère” 
Flavio Escribano describes a sector of gamification that he calls 
“technological gamification” (Escibano 2012, 206–7). This is a type 
of gamification that is triggered and driven by technological 
innovation.10 Escribano describes how large­scale simulations, 
medical research, sports training, or military operations are run 
on games technology to benefit from gaming’s ease of use, low 
cost, efficiency, legal status and design appeal.
The legitimisation for games being the “new normal” or the pick 
of the day is not social desirability, but a new mode of power. Alex 
Gekker calls this mode of technology­supported power “casual 
power”. His understanding of the concept relies on “designers 
inscribing certain affordances into sociotechnical assemblages 
that aim to nullify users’ reflexive capacities towards the object in 
question and enhancing its black­boxed condition” (Gekker 2015, 
1). As soon as games are accepted as normal the question of why 
they are played at a certain point in time and at a certain place by 
certain people is not asked any longer. It is the alleged normality 
10 Technological gamification differs from what Escribano calls “natural 
gamification” and “forced gamification” as it is accepted on the basis of a 
hegemonic status of technology versus other forms of knowledge or belief 
(Escribano 2012, 203–6).
15that keeps players and non­players alike from asking the ques­
tion. Casual power transforms quotidian realities of everyday 
users, supplementing thinking or pre­thinking with suggested 
actions (Berry 2014).
The rationale of total gamification can be compared to the 
rationale of total mobilisation that was introduced by the director 
of German electric company AEG, Walther Rathenau and by 
General Erich Ludendorff one hundred years ago. Both for indus­
trial resources and human resources (Ludendorff 1935) total 
mobilisation was demanded to progress in the war.11 The request 
was not only to have more soldiers to fight, but to extend the 
resources for production and warfare to non­Germans, to women 
and to the youth.12 Thirty years later Goebbels specified quite 
clearly what he had in mind when talking about the prospective 
participants of a total war: invalids from the eastern front, men 
and women working in the military industry, medical staff, 
scientists, artists, teachers, women, the young and the extremely 
old.13 The expansion of core human resources to include a wide 
and diverse range of age groups, ethnicities and genders sounds 
like a target audience analysis by a gamification consultant of the 
twenty­first century. I do not, of course, want to say here that 
gamification is of the same nature as total mobilisation or even 
11 In an even more brutal form Joseph Goebbels pronounced “total war” in 
his speech at the Berlin Sportpalast on February 18, 1943. Once more, a 
concentration and mobilisation of human resources (women and children) 
and of technology was asked for to progress the war in a state of allegedly 
temporary crisis. “The crises that our east front is momentarily suffering 
from” (translation by the author, German original: “Die Krise, in der sich 
unsere Ostfront augenblicklich befindet”).
12 Cf. Imbusch (2005, 526), who identifies the following elements of total war: 
total mobilisation, total control, totality of methods, totality of the aims and 
objectives.
13 Translation by the author, German original: “deutsche Verwundete von 
der Ostfront […] Rüstungsarbeiter und ­arbeiterinnen aus den Berliner 
Panzerwerken, Ärzte, Wissenschaftler, Künstler, Lehrer […] Über das ganze 
Rund des Sportpalastes verteilt sehe ich Tausende von deutschen Frauen. 
Die Jugend ist hier vertreten und das Greisenalter”.
16 total war. It is, however, quite striking how the radical integration 
of broader audiences into serious gaming and the radicality 
of wartime recruitment follow similar rhetorics. Evangelists of 
gamification like McGonigal (2011) talk about “gaming as a spiritual 
practice”, others pretend that “gamification design is largely 
about what is pleasureable” (Schell 2010)14 and obscure eco­
nomic objectives and interest. Erich Ludendorff talks about the 
“spiritual unity of the people”15 and obscures the firing quota that 
he aims at in the first instance.
I have to clarify here, that I do not think that the current state of 
gamification has already reached a level of societal permeation 
that would justify talk of total gamification at the present time. 
What I have tried to point out is a tendency or a risk for the 
liberating power of playfulness to turn into a doctrine. In a situ­
ation like this it is so much more important to point out lines of 
flight from a totality of play. This is exactly what the authors of 
this book are concerned about.
Karen Palmer draws lines of flight for bodies and brains to 
escape traps. Tanya Krzywinska opens the discourse of playful­
ness towards the uncanny and the dark when she talks about 
the gamification of Gothic. Astrid Ensslin makes us aware of the 
power of narratives when we deal with worlds that are often mis­
taken as visual worlds, and the philosopher Markus Rautzenberg 
casts a critical glance at essentialisms that prevent us from 
looking for exceptions, uncertainties or the lack of supposed 
uncertainties.
14 Schell ideologises gamification by saying: “We are moving from a time when 
life was all about survival to a time when it was about efficiency into a new 
era where gamification design is largely about what is pleasureable” (Schell 
2010).
15 German original: “Seelische Geschlossenheit des Volkes” (Ludendorff 1935).
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Gamification	of	 
Gothic 
Tanya Krzywinska
Gothic themes, characters, stories, and environments can be 
found across a wide range of videogames, from puzzle games to 
multiplayer online games, and from shoot ‘em ups to strategy 
games. With so many games drawing on the Gothic, why haven’t 
game scholars been asking why games so frequently call upon 
it? Is this simply symptomatic of a decline in a humanities’ 
approach to games and culture generally? More wide­ranging 
and focused work is certainly required as there is a major lack 
of sustained scholarly engagement with Gothic in videogames.1 
In an effort to begin the task of remedying this, and as part of a 
more extensive project,2 this paper plots some initial coordinates 
of the domain, locating some of its major features, and provides 
a framework for evaluating the uses of Gothic in games. My 
1 While there is work focused specifically on horror games, such as Perron’s 
collection Horror Video Games (2009), there is no book or edited collection 
on the topic of Gothic in games. The author has, however, written several 
articles on the Gothic in games including entries in Blackwell guides to the 
Gothic.
2 The author is currently working on a book entitled Gothic Games 
(forthcoming).
22 underlying agenda here is that a Gothic perspective on games 
provides a methodology that enables sharper critical insight 
into the aesthetic and pleasure economies of games. Under the 
shield of humanities I bring together Game Studies with Gothic 
Studies, both of which share an attentiveness to the formation 
and reception of certain types of texts and their “meaning 
potential”. Game studies and Gothic studies both carry and 
are constitutive of culture, and are laden with signification and 
organised around patterns. As Mikko Lehtonen puts it, “texts are 
not stuck on top of the rest of the world, as messages detachable 
from it, but participate in a central way in the making of reality 
as well as forming our image of it” (2000, 11). Gothic Studies 
evaluates texts, the way they are used and engaged with across 
a range of media and cultural practices. Game Studies focuses 
specifically on the formal specificities of games and the way they 
are played and engaged with. This paper calls on material from 
both provinces to fulfil its aim of understanding how videogame 
media shape the constitution of Gothic and my conviction that 
games have the capacity to add a new dimension to Gothic 
fiction’s arsenal of affects. This is therefore a paper that pivots on 
the verb “gamification”, which becomes therefore “remediation”: 
describing the process of adapting a text, activity, genre, mode 
or style into game form. While this paper takes the position that 
Gothic is always rhetorically constituted, it claims there are more 
coherent claims on the nomenclature of Gothic than others, and 
that these must be identified if we are to understand in what 
form Gothic appears (or disappears) in games. 
Scholarly work on videogames has grown apace since the first 
flush of books and articles came out in the early 2000s. Setting 
out the terms of this new field of academic study meant that 
much of the foundational work adopted a generalist approach 
by necessity. Espen Aarseth (2003) and Jesper Juul (2001) for 
example focused on what was common to all videogames and 
in so doing privileged computing, rules and game mechanics 
over the descriptive, adjectival and representational aspects of 
23games. By contrast Janet Murray (2001, 2003) focused on games 
as story­based “cyberdramatic experiences”, an approach that 
helped spark the “narratology/ludology” debate.3 So dominant 
did this debate become that it obscured or discouraged other 
approaches to the academic study of games within the arts 
and humanities. This preoccupation with the (problematic) 
relationships between game rules and story, mechanics and rep­
resentation, alongside the aspiration to ascertain the universal 
principles of videogames, left little scope for the investigation 
of more niche aspects. The situation was further intensified by 
the denouncement of work that mapped older methods and 
concepts, such as those developed within literature or film 
studies, onto games. Ignoring the value of comparative media 
analysis, Markku Eskelinen (2001) and Espen Aarseth (2003) pro­
nounced that such endeavour ignored what was radically new 
and different about the medium of videogames.4 This combative 
milieu, where rhetoric served the creation of opposing poles, 
was not favourable to the study of something so apparently 
narratological and representational as the presence of Gothic in 
games, even though aspects of it appeared in a range of well­
known commercial games around that time.5 
More conducive to the study of Gothic in games is a “textual” 
approach, notably Marie Laure Ryan’s work on immersive, 
3 Ludologists claimed that game mechanics were what defined games, not 
story. Now, most game scholars regard stories (where they are present) 
as important elements of the game­play experience that give meaning to 
the procedural elements of games. For a useful précis of the narratology/
ludology debate and the building blocks of Game Studies see First Person: 
New Media as Story, Performance and Game (Wardrip­Fruin and Harrigan 
2004).
4 An odd stance to take as a comparative approach has proved very useful 
in efforts to reveal what is new and different, as is evident, for example, in 
Henry Jenkins’ work on transmediality and media convergence (2006) and 
that undertaken more generally within the Comparative Media Centre at 
MIT.
5 Examples include Phantasmagoria (1995), Myst (1993) and Return to Castle 
Wolfenstein (2001).
24 interactive worlds as texts (2001). Craig Lindley (2002) too advo­
cated a more holistic approach to games, seeing story, rules and 
mechanics as unified whole, an approach echoed in Barry Atkins’ 
More Than a Game (2003). Building on their earlier work and 
applying Roland Barthes’ expanded notion of cultural artefacts 
as text, the introduction to Videogame, Player, Text (Atkins and 
Krzywinska, 2007) argued for the textual analysis of games. 
They did so not just in terms of story and representational 
gambits, but claimed code, rules and mechanics as intrinsic to 
the creation of games as “readable” textual artefacts. I would add 
that “reading” is often an integral part of playing a game, thereby 
acting itself as a core game mechanic. Atkins and Krzywinska also 
noted that games require a player/reader to kick them into action, 
thereby activating the semiotic, kinetic and affective energies that 
constitute player experience. Diane Carr extends this text/player 
synergy by arguing for the importance of taking into account the 
situated nature of play (2007), an idea developed more sharply 
in her work on disability and games (2013) which concentrates 
on the embodied player and the differences in play through the 
particularity of that embodiment. 6 Graeme Kirkpatrick argues 
for a balance between semiosis and experience, suggesting that 
fixing exclusively on the “meaning” of games elides the fact that 
our pleasure in playing games, as with playing with a ball, may 
originate in something more plastic: “Video games do not have 
to ‘mean’ anything to be popular and their popularity can be 
intelligible without reference to interpretation” (2011, 17). The sum 
of such scholarship provides a more nuanced understanding of 
the complex relations between videogame, player and text, and 
it is symptomatic that the analysis in this paper attends to the 
experiential “doing” element of what it is to play a game in order 
to make its argument that games have the capacity to bring a 
6 As well providing a framework for uncovering some of the normative 
assumptions of earlier work on games, and indeed in terms of games 
themselves, Carr’s work on ability and disability is also highly relevant to the 
articulation of the Gothic in videogames.
25new dimension to Gothic ­ even if that capability is by no means 
fully realised. A more rounded approach to the study of games 
is preferred because it takes into account how games are made, 
how they are played and how they draw on and are constitutive 
of culture. Most importantly, the textual analysis deployed 
within this paper allows us to evaluate the types of intertextual 
patterns and rhythms used to produce and articulate Gothic in 
games. It further permits evaluation of the impact the character­
istic features of digital games (such as interactive, cybernetic, 
haptic, kinetic and embodied dimensions) have on the way Gothic 
is actualised ludically. The movement away from an exclusive 
rules­centric take on ludology (the study of games) towards more 
diverse approaches has widened the horizon of Game Studies, 
thereby enabling work that is more focused on individual games 
and genres, as well as on topics such as gender and philosophy. 
This extended range provides the scope required for a study of 
Gothic gamification. 
Every game is comprised of systems that define and manage a 
player’s actions. Most videogames possess an interface and are 
composed of rules, progress arcs, and winning conditions. Each 
game tailors these elements according to its own design logic 
which in turn governs the disposition of a game’s spatiality and 
perspective. Therefore, to progress within a game, a player must 
actively engage with the particular demands set for him or her by 
the design of a game’s mechanics. These mechanics range from 
the simple to the complex, encompassing what a player has to do 
in a game as well as the various elements of computing behind 
delivering the interface controls and the game to the screen. The 
specific horizon of interactivity, the particular scope of feedback 
mechanisms, and the precise arrangement of the interface 
configure around the overarching game concept. In addition to 
the characteristics of a given gaming platform and the market 
intended for that game, all these factors play a critical role in the 
particular way that a game “gamifies” Gothic. It is methodological 
26 consideration of these elements that provides part of the frame­
work for critical evaluation.
Constructing a systematic theorisation of how the primary 
elements of a game treat their Gothic subject only proves 
productive and transcends taxonomy if an evaluation of that 
treatment is framed by a notional and coordinating sense of what 
is meant by Gothic. I began this work with an intuitive sense that 
there are vast variations in the effective, and indeed affective, 
uses of Gothic in games, and as work for this study progressed, 
that sense has intensified. Definition is therefore no simple 
task, especially considering that Gothic has spanned such a 
breadth of mood, time and location As Fred Botting notes “[t]he 
diffusion of Gothic forms and figures […] makes the definition of a 
homogeneous generic category very difficult” (1996, 14). In his dis­
cussion of the uncertainty in scholarly definitions of the Gothic, 
David Punter writes that there is a “significant resistance to 
canonization” (2000, ix), suggesting that there is no one text that 
substantiates Gothic. It is therefore largely agreed within recent 
scholarship on the topic that Gothic is brimful of vertiginous, 
acute tangents and perplexing ambiguities. While Platonic ideals 
are overly confining, it is nonetheless necessary to pin­up some 
principles if we’re to grasp what Gothic means for games. I do 
this from a broadly structuralist premise: games have a grammar. 
Game makers select elements from an established game 
grammar to construct a specific vocabulary for their game. The 
same can be said of Gothic. As with games, a set of conventions 
emerge cumulatively and proliferate from similar texts, sounding 
the structural beat to which story, style and theme dance. This 
does not mean an individual convention is stable or foundational 
however, and we can make useful application here of the struc­
turalist axis of substitution and the plasticity that this affords to 
any meaning­producing system.7 A radical change to the overall 
7 Applying with some caveats Saussure’s axes of langue and parole to genre, 
Rick Altman writes, “language is … dependent on a different selection of 
paroles” (1999, 174). 
27pattern leads to hybridity and unfamiliarity (and in some cases 
creates a change in grammar). Patrick Kennedy (n.d.) provides a 
historically and visually aware definition of Gothic into which core 
renderings of otherness and affect are folded: Gothic “employs 
dark and picturesque scenery, startling melodramatic devices, 
and an overall atmosphere of exoticism, mystery and dread” 
(Kennedy n.d.). From here we can ask what the formal properties 
of games bring.
Gothic’s capacity for constant and definition­bruising reinvention 
is evident through the ease of its adaptation into game form. 
Alongside Science Fiction, Gothic vocabulary is very commonly 
called upon by game developers making digital, blended (part 
digital) and other types of games (card, board, live­action and 
table­top games). It is perhaps most fully present in games that 
seek the status of art and pursue the creation of an experience 
of the sublime, such as The Path (2009) and Dear Esther (2012). 
It is also present in those games that utilise the sensationalist 
qualities of the supernatural to provoke a brooding sense of 
dread from a player, such as the case with the Silent Hill series 
(1999–present), Fatal Frame (2002), and Dead Space (2008). Gothic 
tropes also appear in games that do not seek primarily to dis­
comfort players and which may be best defined as “cute”, as is 
the case with A Vampyre Story (2008) or the Burtonesque MediEvil 
(1988). With these games we have to scrutinise the function of 
their Gothic elements to evaluate their relationship with Gothic. 
Gothic is best regarded as central to a games overall concept 
where Gothic themes and devices are woven into story, game 
mechanics and representational style. In other games, rep­
resentation and iconography might draw directly on Gothic but 
cannot be said to pervasively inform gameplay and/or story. 
The Secret of Monkey Island (1990) for instance makes use of the 
supernatural and Gothic tropes but any potential for Gothic affect 
is lost in favour of light­hearted playfulness. Investigating the 
edges of Gothic, where style might not be underpinned by a more 
pervasive means of producing the affect of apprehension, shows 
28 how Gothic can be used to better understand games, as well as 
the conditions for its remediation in a game context.
Gothic Coordinates
Here I will propose five major coordinating nodes of Gothic in 
relation to games: character/story patterns; mise-en-scène and 
style; affect; entropy and sublime. Gothic is found in the way 
that these elements are handled or deployed. We can use these 
to evaluate the coherence of Gothic conventions (to pun on 
Sedgwick (1986)), as recipe for construction, or, as a method of 
critical appraisal.
An obliging place to start is the effect of Gothic on character 
and story patterns. Manuel Aguirre argues that Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein (1818) makes use of the structural components of 
the hero’s tale, reconfigured to stage the alternative journey 
of the “false hero”; “a hero who is not a hero” (2013, 11), the one 
who fails, who succumbs to entropy, the figure of tragedy.8 The 
presence of this structural pattern and its particular recon­
figuration provides our first major coordinate for defining and 
evaluating Gothic in games.9 As Aguirre puts it, “Gothic abides 
by fairy tale narrative rules; it is only that Gothic individual who 
crosses over into the Other is no real hero […] A key to Gothic thus 
resides in its centering the flawed character as protagonist [while] 
the standard hero of traditional tales is often demoted to a 
helpless or passive stance” (2013, 11). This latter point benchmarks 
a structural patterning that appears in relation to themes and 
economies of agency in a range of Gothic games and which 
provides a pivotal node in the process of judging whether the 
use of the grammar is simply replication or innovation. Examples 
8 For the purposes of this essay, the hero and the false hero could be either 
male or female.
9 Warcraft (1994) and World of Warcraft (2004–present) players might recognise 
Arthas’ journey from hero to false hero as one way that this game calls on 
and makes use of the Gothic. 
29of games drawing on false hero structures include American 
McGee’s Alice (2000), Planescape Torment (1999), Shadow of the 
Colossus (2005/2006) and indie platformer Limbo (2010) as well as 
roguelike The Binding of Isaac (2011). The “false hero” is therefore 
emblematic of our first coordinate.
Our second coordinate is a particular use of mise-en-scène 
(and by extension visual style) which can be symptomatic and 
spatially locative of the journey of the “false hero”.  Haunted, 
disquieted and uncanny spaces abound as “representations of 
estrangement” made strange not by some property of the space 
itself but as products of the cultural imagination (Vidler 1992, 
12). Numerous games make use of Gothic locations, typically 
haunted houses, spooky woods, crypts and graveyards, derelict 
buildings, attics and cellars, without recourse to the “false hero” 
pattern, begging a question about the strength of a given game 
text’s claim on Gothic. Here we might include the common use 
of chiaroscuro, strong­contrast lighting to create visual drama, 
perhaps emblematic of an occulted moral order, or low­contrast 
lighting and/or muted colours to create a sense of grim griminess 
serving often to illustrate ruin or decay. Colour is important in the 
creation of Gothic atmospheres alongside baroque architectures, 
labyrinths, ruins and decay, and a strong sense of isolation. In 
addition, scenery that provides a strong sense of drama through 
relative scale as provided by the mountains and abysses encoun­
tered by the heroine of Radcliffe’s seminal Gothic novel The Mys-
teries of Udolpho (1794) and echoed, for example, in The Shadow of 
the Colossus. This latter feature locks­in perfectly with coordinate 
five. Many games made using 3D modelling tools create discrete 
objects for placement within the game field. These objects are 
therefore very heavily described and in some ways fighting 
against the ambiguity and spectrality expected of Gothic; particle 
effects therefore are commonly used in games that call on Gothic 
to make geometry – and therefore the visual plane – less solid 
and indeterminate. 
30 The mode of representation, best termed “style”, encompasses 
the aesthetic choices made in the realisation of mise-en-scène, 
the types of adjectives used, the objects chosen and used or the 
type of lighting for example. Style also includes the aesthetic 
rationale behind the choices made to organise the delivery of 
a story and is therefore manifest through editing, phrasing, 
elisions, use of time, auditory or visual elements, such as colour 
palette. It is important to note that it is not so much the individual 
components in themselves that comprise Gothic, but how these 
form patterns and how those patterns draw on the ‘word­hoard’ 
of previous Gothic texts and artefacts. Style and mise-en-scène 
commonly come together to produce indirect, environmental 
story­telling in the context of games. This mode of delivery is 
linked to a player’s traversal of the game space and contributes 
to the creation of a stronger sense of presence within the game 
world for a player, thereby providing a foundation potentially for 
the generation of affect. 
Out of such configurations emerge different flavours of Gothic 
that have their own distinctive patterns: fairy tale Gothic, 
Victorian Gothic, American Gothic or (even) Weird Gothic, 
for instance. These patterns might be juxtaposed with other 
generic, affective or stylistic patterns to form hybrids or to create 
meaning through difference; Martin Wills, for example, argues 
that “Dickens uses Gothic to isolate certain spaces to mark them 
off” (2012, 22). In addition to which, there may be a largely uniform 
Gothic style yet with no use of a Gothic “false hero”, or there may 
a Gothic treatment of a genre. There are therefore games that 
use some aspects of Gothic, demonstrating the value of Wills’ 
exhortation that, “[i]t is not where Gothic might be found that is 
important by why it is found, what it is employed to do” (Wills, 
17; emphasis in original). Function therefore provides our fifth 
coordinate, helping us to evaluate the potential uses of Gothic 
in games; for example, localised use of Gothic helps reinforce 
the value of “home” in Lord of the Rings Online (2007–present), 
as it does in Tolkien’s works. Gothic is used in World of Warcraft 
31(2004) through the Undead race to demonstrate moral relativism 
and, in a different context, provides the means to fuse together 
an ambiguous mix of power and objectification in Bayonetta 
(2009/2010). Function is then our third coordinate.
Our fourth coordinate is the representation, simulation and/
or production of a related group of psychologically affective 
emotional states: paralysis, claustrophobia, vertigo, alienation, 
estrangement, dread, discomfort and disorientation. Games 
often attempt to provoke such feelings for players and these may 
arise logically in some cases from game mechanics and story 
type, aligned often to the return­of­the­repressed structure 
as well as through the particular deployments of elements of 
mise-en-scène. Like adventure, comedy or romance, Gothic fiction 
carries a certain affective expectation, although many games that 
make cursory use of Gothic tropes have no intention to create 
a pervasive Gothic affect. In the context of games, incapacity, 
dread and claustrophobia (often rendered as a form of live burial) 
translate into the dimension of performance. In this sense Gothic 
redacts agency, using it to create sensation. Certainly sound also 
plays its role in heightening sensation, often helping to intensify 
panic or confusion. Games such as Silent Hill famously use sound 
to confuse and alienate, working against spatial and harmonious 
expectation to grate and grind on the player; fog is used to give a 
very palpable sense of claustrophobia, disabling the player from 
being prepared for what is coming and redacting the scope of 
player agency. The “dread” mechanic is also becoming a feature 
of Gothic­informed games, wherein events paralyse the player­
character, as in Call of Cthulhu: Dark Corners of the Earth (2006) 
and Lord of the Rings Online. A Gothic game aesthetic is therefore 
correlated directly and powerfully with players through the (in)
ability to perform.
And then a Plank in Reason, broke, 
And I dropped down, and down – 
And hit a World, at every plunge, 
32 And finished knowing – then –  
“I felt a Funeral, in my brain” Emily Dickinson 
Entropy and the sublime is our fifth coordinate. You might 
already detect a disjunction between Gothic and normative 
game grammar and we need a detour here to get to this fifth 
coordinate. Games and puzzles are built on the notion that there 
is a solution, a winning condition, and many games that we might 
easily call Gothic, such as the Midnight Mysteries (2009–2012) 
series, are therefore caught up within a polarisation between 
the normative vocabulary of games, where players are catalysts 
for redemption, and the intractable sense of loss and entropy 
that characterises Gothic. There are however different ways that 
winning can be treated and contextualised while still making 
use of generic game vocabulary, providing thereby a means to 
develop a specifically Gothic winning condition that grows out 
of story and function. Here winning would not be triumphant, 
but instead melancholy, experienced as a loss of something or 
someone, as occurs in Primal (2003) where Jen fails to save her 
boyfriend and loses something of the vulnerability that makes 
her human, allowing her, however, to survive in a metaphysically 
disturbed and physically hostile world. The total rejection of any 
winning condition does of course challenge the very definition of 
a game. 
Games do, though, have their own occulted forces: AI and the 
logic­based machinations of an invisible computational layer, as 
well as the Skinnerist arrays of feedback from which games are 
constituted. These can be exploited thematically and textually 
towards entropic ends when placed in a pervasive Gothic con­
text. This resonant and modally located consequence might also 
help to explain the popularity of Gothic in games. In a Gothic 
context, a game’s algorithmic system potentially accrues a mys­
terious, godlike power that steers choice, behaviour and morality 
through arrays of determinants, and positive or negative rein­
forcements. This feature is used thematically and resonantly in 
Bioshock (2007) as well as in distinctly Gothic­Weird context of 
33The Stanley Parable (2011). The occulted layer that presides with 
such potency over a player’s actions and which determines the 
extent and appropriateness of those actions provides then a key 
for unlocking the potential of a special functional bond between 
videogame form and Gothic, and which gives additional scope for 
a player to experience, in a ludic sense, the position of the false 
hero.
 “To act” (and to act in a timely and correct manner) is the leading 
currency of interactive games and “to be unable to act” is Gothic 
articulation, or perversion, of this currency in games. In Call 
of Cthulhu: Dark Corners of the Earth, a player­character must 
often run from situations rather than stand and fight. There is 
no gun provided early in the game; no chance to prove yourself 
an unconditional action hero. Following Lovecraft’s pessimistic 
mythos/ethos on which the game is based, the game places a 
player­character as subject to events rather than their master. 
This is symbolised by periods of madness and fear that inter­
fere with a player­character’s ability to act. Core to creating the 
sensation of claustrophobia, a palpable sense of vulnerability 
is essential to Gothic’s affective intent. In many games the 
opposite pertains; for many players, pleasure is found in the 
sense of invulnerability games generate. In the gendered eco­
nomics of popular culture, vulnerability is often represented by 
a female character, which Carol Clover argues provides a means 
of allowing men to experience fear safely at one remove (1992). 
In some Gothic games, female characters are played against 
gender tropes, that is, as skillful and resourceful: for example, 
Alice of American McGee’s Alice is highly rational and capable even 
if the entire world has become irrational and nightmarish; while 
Jen in Primal (2003) develops demonic attributes in her quest to 
save her kidnapped boyfriend. In these cases there is an altered 
relationship with power afforded by playing against gender 
convention. The presence of a player­character as false hero is a 
pivot on which a game can conjure a potent and pervasive Gothic 
configuration and a method for understanding gaming norms. 
34 Games are repeatedly sold to players as affording agency and 
skill, where the deft practice of hand­eye coordination and acute 
timeliness is rewarded with positive feedback; these work in 
contradistinction to existential dread, claustrophobia, paralysing 
fear, and an inability to act that are constitutive of Gothic. 
Within the heroic and Vitruvian structure of many games, Gothic 
elements are overcome and mastered: the Other is compart­
mentalised and projected outward, the real of the body and 
difference subdued, and normative notions of human sovereignty 
reinforced.
Death in real life is a curtailment of agency (even if the effects 
of our acts might be felt after our demise). Many games deny 
the finality of real death, and become simply a prompt for the 
player to try harder to learn what the game requires for them to 
progress. Death is functional in games, rather than sublime. It 
is simply another feedback mechanism.10 In most games we are 
shown how we are defined by death: it is not entropic. A player­
character “dies” and returns in the most un­Gothic of ways; they 
do not haunt the screen (although this might be said to be the 
case in Dark Souls 2 (2014)).11 In and of itself this return is literally 
“canny” rather than uncanny – canny in the sense that you get to 
retry and re­write your game history. In most games, and echoing 
Freud’s notion of the death drive (2003), a lack of progression is 
constitutive of how death signifies – and only calls on the Gothic 
because it redacts agency (but only temporarily and often as a 
stage on the road of progress). As such, in most games, death 
signifies non­metaphysically through an oscillating movement 
between action and inaction, and from stasis to progress 
(Krzywinska 2002). To prevail is to progress effectively, denying 
the sublime entropy that gives Gothic its fearful symmetry. 
The way in which death is realised, and how it is tied to a game 
mechanics, has then an impact on the realisation of Gothic, and 
10 Cf. Markus Rautzenberg’s text in this book [editor’s comment].
11 Thanks to Jack Hackett for drawing my attention to Dark Souls 2. 
35a game’s claim on the nomenclature. I would offer the following: 
the more meaning and intensity assigned to death, the more 
intently are activated our five coordinates and therefore the more 
intently “Gothic” a game can be deemed to be. 
Games often draw on Gothic as a “marketing tool for writers 
anxious to gain access to popular reading audiences” (Gamer 
2000, 29). Such patterns are clearly useful for the game industry 
which has relied on clear communication with its target market 
to get a return on their development investment. In game terms 
the use of ritualised textual patterns also has the function of 
manifesting the “magic circle”, Huizinga’s term for the way that 
we enter a different mindset and social relation when playing a 
game (1971). In this sense the conflation of “Gothic” and “game” 
becomes a fast track means of constructing the space of the 
Other, but this doesn’t necessarily imply transgression. The 
mutability of Gothic may well imply change and movement, but it 
also makes it a great commercial ally. This is why the treatment of 
otherness and entropy is so important, if we are to retain Gothic 
as a critical methodology. Entropy and otherness must there­
fore be sutured into the fabric of the game through our other 
four coordinates. This Gothic can be mobilised to question reified 
assumptions and fictions that we use to shore up and solidify 
our existence and which are supported by the unproblematised 
agency and Vitruvian coordinates of many games. In some 
few videogames, with room for more, Gothic becomes a mode 
through which the very borders and capabilities of this new 
expressive medium can be explored. With their coded base easily 
manipulated by the cognoscenti, their branching narratives, and 
the provision in some cases of tools for adding to their content, 
games share with Gothic the appeal of collective myth and a type 
of immersion and participation that disturbs and transforms. 
Gothic pulls in a different direction from some of the normative 
features of videogames, particularly the idea that games can be 
“won” and where death equates to “trying again”, yet games are 
36 nonetheless pregnant with Gothic potential because they are 
predicated on agency, performance and progress. 
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Video Games as 
Unnatural Narratives
Astrid Ensslin
Introduction
What I aim to undertake here is to approach video games from 
a territory within postclassical narratology hitherto largely 
untouched by ludologists. The study of unnatural narratives 
is one of the most recent fields within contemporary narrative 
theory and deeply intertwined with the endeavour to under­
stand how human beings make sense of narrative texts and 
artefacts across media that cannot be sufficiently accounted 
for or analysed using traditional narratological theories (Alber 
et al. 2010, 113). So this article seeks to open up a new field of 
ludo­narratological enquiry targeted, in particular, at games that 
push ludo­narratological boundaries and call out for meta­ludic 
debate and reflection, albeit not necessarily with an avant­garde 
agenda in mind. In fact, the games that I’m going to look at in the 
analytical part of this study are commercially traded and played 
by global audiences, possibly because rather than despite the 
fact that they prima facie go against the grain, and call out for 
42 meta­ludic debate, specialised analytical tools and conceptual 
frameworks.
The idea for this project grew out of my previous monograph 
project on Literary Gaming (Ensslin 2014), which is situated at 
the junction between indie games, electronic literature and 
ludo­stylistic analysis. For this book I deliberately chose the title 
literary “gaming” rather than “games” because literary games 
proper (in the sense of games that embed literary structures and 
encourage literary reading interwoven with gameplay) are only 
one sub­form of what I see as a continuum between ludic digital 
literature (where literary reading is foregrounded and games 
and play are integrated in digital literary structures) and literary 
games as I’ve just described them. So in a nutshell, the study 
of literary gaming looks at hybrid digital media that combine 
different types of gameplay and literary reading which cause 
clashes and creative interplay between what Hayles (2007) calls 
“hyperattention” and “deep attention” in reader­players. Ludic 
forms of digital literature correlate mostly with the deep attentive 
side of the spectrum, while literary games are experienced in a 
mostly hyperattentive state.
The term literary gaming spans a wide range of ludo­literary 
media including poetry games,1 literary/narrative auteur games,2 
interactive fiction,3 ludic and meta­ludic types of hypertext 
and hypermedia,4 as well as more linear ludo­literary digital 
narratives produced in Flash, Shockwave and other interactive 
1 For example, by Jason Nelson, Jim Andrews and Gregory Weir.
2 For an explanation of this term, see Ensslin (2014). For examples of such 
games see those by Mike Bithell, Jonathan Blow, Tale of Tales, and Galactic 
Café/Davey Wreden.
3 For example, works by Nick Montfort, Emily Short and Aaron Reed.
4 For example, by geniwate, Deena Larsen, Robert Kendall and Richard 
Holeton.
43animation technologies,5 as well as navigable 3D literary 
environments.6
This essay forms a first step towards my new book project 
(co­authored with digital stylistician Alice Bell) called Unnatural 
Narratives and Digital Fiction (Ensslin and Bell, forthcoming), 
which applies theoretical and analytical concepts of unnatural 
narratology to various types of digital fictions (including 
hypertext fiction, Flash fiction, interactive fiction and narrative 
games). I’m going to discuss some ways of understanding 
unnaturalness in games, using two very different definitions of 
the unnatural in comparison, and explore the extent to which 
they may be useful to close analysis. I will begin by providing 
some theoretical background on videogames’ narrativity, on 
unnatural narratives and unnatural narratology. I’ll then move 
on to a dual argument based on two divergent definitions of 
unnaturalness: given a broad conceptual framework, I propose 
that – in many ways – videogames are unnatural narratives 
par excellence; therefore the term can be seen as somewhat 
tautological when it comes to ludic narrativity. 
Taking a more narrow, aesthetically oriented definition as a 
starting point, I contend, in a second move, that some games are 
more “unnatural” than others, and that the idiosyncratic ludo­
narrative mechanics exhibited by them allow us to apply, adapt 
and further develop existing concepts and tools developed by 
unnatural narratologists. In the analytical part of this essay I’ll 
then have a look at three games in particular that showcase some 
key aspects of unnatural narratology at work: Tale of Tales’ The 
Path (2009), and its uses of unnatural spatiality, Jonathan Blow’s 
Braid (2009) and its uses of unnatural temporality and, finally, 
Galactic Café’s The Stanley Parable (2013) and its uses of unnatural 
narration – in particular the role of the would­be omniscient 
5 For example, works by Serge Bouchardon, Kate Pullinger and Christine 
Wilks.
6 For example, by Andy Campbell and Judi Alston.
44 narrator and his conflict with the player­character. In my closing 
remarks I’ll sum up some of my initial conclusions about the rel­
evance and feasibility of unnatural narratology for the study of 
games, and I’ll make some suggestions as to how we may develop 
this analytical approach further to accommodate the media­
specificity of digital games and gaming.
Ludo-narratological Assumptions
The ludo­narratological approach taken here is set against the 
background of what are by now widely agreed assumptions 
about the narrativity of games. First, a game isn’t a narrative in 
the sense of a pre­scripted sequence of events, or indeed “any 
semiotic object produced with the intent of evoking a [pre­
intended] narrative script in the mind of the audience” (Ryan 
2004a, 9). Instead, they possess narrativity, as Marie­Laure Ryan 
puts it in Narrative Across Media (2004a, 9), which means that they 
have the potential to evoke multiple, individualised narrative 
scripts through settings, characters and other elements that 
players interact with through choice and with the intention to 
solve problems and make progress. Thus, in gameplay, users are 
turned into characters, and as players we enact the destiny, or 
the trajectory, of the game world autotelically (Ryan 2004a, 349), 
that is, through our own motivated actions rather than being told 
about or shown events as we are in fiction, drama or film.
 – In a more detailed analysis, Henry Jenkins (2004) breaks 
the narrative properties of games into three core 
concepts:
 – “Environmental storytelling” means that games are 
designed as environments, as worlds full of characters 
and props for players to interact with (much like Disney 
World and other amusement parks). Players explore 
games spatially, in an episodic way, and this nonlinear 
model is kept coherent by an overarching goal and 
repetitive mechanic. Games also form part of a larger 
storytelling ecology, which brings to mind Jenkins’ (2006) 
45theory of transmedia storytelling, which assumes that 
stories develop and evolve across media, rather than 
simply being re­mediated or adapted). Finally, games are 
evocative spaces with large mnemonic potential in that 
they evoke the structures of existing stories and the genre 
traditions of other media.7
 – “Emergent narratives” refers to the ways in which players 
create their own stories by exploring the game world 
(corresponding roughly to Ryan’s (2004a) autotelic enact­
ment). These stories become manifest in oral storytelling 
or participatory media, such as gamer fora or on YouTube, 
where gamers post their own playthroughs, walkthroughs, 
Let’s Plays etc.
 – “Embedded narratives”, which are any non­interactive 
narrative sequences integrated into or surrounding 
gameplay, such as cut­scenes, backstory descriptions 
or dialogues (written or voiced­over). They tend to be 
embedded in such a way as not to impede the interactive 
flow of gameplay, and they may function as rewards or 
level­up markers; they may help drive the story forward 
or bridge loading time. Needless to say, their usefulness 
and aesthetic potential are controversial topics amongst 
gamers, and there are significant cultural differences with 
respect to accepted duration and player patience (Ensslin 
2011, 166).
Arguably there’s a lot more to say about videogame narrativity 
more generally, but I’ll now move straight on to the core 
theoretical interest of this essay: the varying concepts of 
“unnatural” narrativity and how they may or may not contribute 
to understanding video games as ludo­narrative media.
7 For example, Red Dead Redemption (2010) vis­à­vis the Western genre, the 
Lego series, Star Wars or Indiana Jones.
46 Unnatural Narratives – Unnatural 
Narratology
Before embarking on an examination of what unnatural 
narratives are, it needs to be acknowledged that the term is 
highly evocative of numerous problematic meanings and uses: it 
carries ideology­ridden connotations of hegemonic “normality”, 
of discursively constructed social and cultural hierarchies, and 
oppositions and binary thought more generally. Furthermore, the 
school of “unnatural narratologists” (much like that of “natural 
narratologists”) is deeply rooted in western, Anglo­American 
scholarship, and the vast majority of texts studied under this 
theoretical umbrella are authored by Anglo­American writers, 
which leaves a large part of global narrativity unaccounted 
for. Finally, popular notions of “unnaturalness” are negatively 
connoted, as it is often used to “denounce certain types of 
behavior (as well as sexual orientations or practices) which the 
speaker considers to be deviant or perverse” (Alber and Heinze 
2011, 2), and this of course adds to the controversy surrounding 
terminological choices underlying this theoretical apparatus.
Having said all that, the term “unnatural” as used by 
narratologists carries a highly specialised set of meanings, and 
can only be comprehended in the context of its derivation. 
It was borrowed from Monika Fludernik’s idea of a “natural 
narratology”, which is anchored in a cognitive approach to human 
experientiality and the ways in which narratives and narrativity 
can be re­evaluated from the point of view of “natural”, or 
“naturally occurring” storytelling in the Labovian sense (1996, 13). 
So the derivate “unnatural” and its surrounding theories form 
a response to Fludernik’s concept, and – despite its somewhat 
misleading negative prefix – the term needs to be understood in 
a distinctly positive, productive sense for purposes of cognitive 
narratological analysis: 
47[t]he aim of an unnatural theoretical approach is to approx­
imate and conceptualize Otherness, rather than to stigmatize 
or reify it; such an approach is interested in various kinds of 
narrative strangeness and in particular in texts that deviate 
from the mimetic norms of most narratological models. 
(Alber and Heinze 2011, 2)8 
One of the most frequently quoted definitions of unnatural 
narratives is by Jan Alber, who describes them as a “subset of 
fictional narratives” (2013a). According to Alber (2013a) such a 
narrative:
violates physical laws, logical principles, or standard 
anthropomorphic limitations of knowledge by representing 
storytelling scenarios, narrators, characters, temporalities, 
or spaces that could not exist in the actual world. 
In other words, unnaturalness is defined ex negativo in opposition 
to the “natural” (see above), which relates to the cognitive frames 
and scripts we have derived from our actual experience of being 
in the world. So according to Alber’s fairly broad and inclusive 
notion, unnaturalness refers to both physically and logically 
impossible narrative structures, which includes the supernatural 
in fairy tales as much as it does, for example, multiple contra­
dictory endings of a story, or two parallel timelines that unfold at 
different speeds.
Another, more narrowly defined and aesthetically oriented con­
cept of unnaturalness is put forward by Brian Richardson. To him, 
unnatural narratives: 
conspicuously violate […] conventions of standard narrative 
forms, in particular the conventions of nonfictional 
narratives, oral or written, and fictional modes like realism 
that model themselves on nonfictional narratives. Unnatural 
8 Of course, the boundary between “natural” and “unnatural” isn’t clear­cut; 
unnaturalness has to be understood as a matter of degree rather than an 
absolute quality.
48 narratives furthermore follow fluid, changing conventions 
and create new narratological patterns in each work. In a 
phrase, unnatural narratives produce a defamiliarization of 
the basic elements of narrative. (Richardson 2011, 34)9
Again, he defines unnaturalness ex negativo as narrative 
structures that are anti­mimetic, which means they are “clearly 
and strikingly impossible in the real world” (Alber et al. 2013, 102) 
and defy the principles of: (a) mimetic, realistic fictional story­
telling, and; (b) the conventions of nonfictional narratives, oral 
and written for purposes of aesthetic innovation, critical pleasure 
and meta­level reflection (Richardson 2011, 34). 
Hence, whereas Alber puts both physical and logical scenarios in 
one “unnatural” basket, Richardson makes a crucial distinction 
between so­called non­mimetic (or physically impossible or 
fantastic) and anti­mimetic narrative structures, which defy the 
principles of reality and realistic storytelling, but also the con­
ventions of existing media genres we tend to be familiar with, 
and not in a deliberately negative, or alienating way, but rather 
in a creative, productive manner that engenders various types 
of reflective thinking in audiences.10 Hence, Richardson’s con­
cept is geared more towards the audience’s (projected or likely 
rather than empirically tested) response than a textual quality. 
What matters to him is “the degree of unexpectedness that the 
text produces, whether surprise, shock, or the wry smile that 
acknowledges that a different, playful kind of representation is at 
work” (Richardson 2015, 5).
The study of unnatural narratives, called unnatural narratology, 
is a subdomain of postclassical narratology (Herman 1999), which 
9 Cf. Shklovsy (1965).
10 According to Alber, Richardson’s “distinction between non­ and anti­mimetic 
elements is identical with [his] distinction between conventionalized and not 
yet conventionalized instances of the unnatural” (Personal correspondence, 
May 30, 2015).
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represents a departure from classical structuralist narratology11 
in that it is both transmedial and transdisciplinary: 
1. It broadens the scope of analytical objects from print­based, 
literary fiction to narrative media more widely, as well as non­
fictional forms of storytelling (in the Labovian tradition of oral 
storytelling).
2. It expands the narratologist’s analytical and conceptual toolkit 
by integrating non­literary disciplines such as post­Saussurean 
linguistics (for example, discourse analysis, possible­worlds 
semantics etc.), gender theory, ethnography, cognitive science 
(schema and frames and scripts theory), film and media 
studies.
As far as its cross­media remit is concerned, unnatural 
narratology has reached out to drama, film, comics, nonfictional 
testimonies and hypertext fiction, but very little work exists (to 
my knowledge) that deals with the idiosyncratic narrativity of 
videogames. So this is where my theoretical and analytical con­
tribution lies with this project.
It ’s not surprising that many, if not most, unnatural narratologists 
have looked at postmodernist narratives (novels, short stories, 
films) when developing their theories. So if I’m proposing in this 
essay that in many ways mainstream videogames are unnatural 
narratives par excellence, I’m doing something quite uncon­
ventional, or theoretically unnatural in its own right, because I’m 
arguing that “unnatural” is actually quite “natural” (or rather con­
ventionalised) when it comes to videogames (according to Alber’s 
definition), and that the body of games that we can meaningfully 
refer to and analyse as “unnatural” (using Richardson’s definition) 
is still fairly small (but growing, and an exciting development to 
follow within the indie sector in particular). 
When studying unnatural narratives, a core, classical 
narratological distinction is usually made between unnaturalness 
11 Associated with Genette, Chatman, Bal and Prince.
50 at story level (which concerns the actual underlying fabula, or 
that which is told), and at discourse level (which is the level of 
the telling, that is, of narrative organisation, sequentialisation or 
design). So, for example, unnatural temporality at the story level 
happens in time­travel narratives (where the protagonist may 
criss­cross between different historical periods consecutively), 
whereas at discourse level the story may remain unaffected 
by discourse­level fragmentation, mixing or reversal, such as 
in Nolan’s Memento (Heinze et al. 2013). For games, this dis­
tinction has to be substituted for by a concept that allows for the 
executability of the underlying code, and Jenkins’s (2004) idea 
of emergent narrativity, where the player’s interaction with the 
coded interface produces as many stories as there are players 
and playthroughs.
Reading Strategies and Conventionalisation
We’ve established earlier that unnaturalness can be understood 
in terms of unconventional and defamiliarising structures and 
experiences. Surely, however, what we’ve come to accept as 
“conventional” hasn’t always been such: basic cognitive frames 
develop over time and the more often we’re exposed to specific 
“impossible” scenarios, the more readily we’ll integrate them into 
our repository of “the possible” – so we naturalise (Culler 1975) 
initially unfamiliar, or defamiliarising structures, by embedding 
them into our cognitive frames of reference. And these mental 
repositories of ours tend to be genre­bound. We’ve become 
used to, for example, speaking animals from fables, fairy tales 
and other types of fantasy (which are non­mimetic but not anti­
mimetic according to Richardson), we’ve conventionalised the 
omnimentality of the omniscient narrator (which is a humanly 
impossible quality – no­one can know everything, least of all 
what other people are thinking exactly, but we’ve become used 
to it especially from classical realist novels), and we’re perfectly 
51well­accustomed to time­travel narratives (as they often occur 
in sci­fi) and physically impossible geographies such as flying 
islands.12
So why and how does conventionalisation happen? Essentially, 
it ’s within our human nature that, when we encounter anything 
unfamiliar, or strange, as we do in unnatural narratives, we try 
to make sense of it in some way, by applying a range of reading 
strategies. As Alber puts it, we are “ultimately bound by [our] 
cognitive architecture, even when trying to make sense of the 
unnatural. Hence, the only way to respond to narratives of all 
sorts (including unnatural ones) is through cognitive frames and 
scripts” (2013b, 451–54), so on the basis of cognitive theory, Alber 
proposes the following reading strategies employed by readers 
(in any combination and any order (cf. Alber 2013c, 49)) to help 
them “come to terms with the unnatural” (2013b, 451): 
1. Frame blending: here we blend pre­existing frames that we 
previously considered to be incompatible (for example, that 
the flow of time may be tied to the direction in which you 
move, which is the case in world four (“Time and Place”) of 
Braid).
2. Generification: evoking genre conventions from literary and 
media history. So here the blending has already happened and 
we’ve integrated it as a possible convention in a given genre or 
medium (for example, time travel in sci­fi narratives; or super­
human jump heights in platformers).
3. Subjectification: here we attribute the unnatural to inter­
nal states, such as dreams, nightmares, or hallucinations. 
We know it’s perfectly natural for our unconscious mind to 
produce highly surreal scenarios, so this option is part of our 
explanatory repository, especially when we’re dealing with 
an unreliable narrator or a vulnerable, victimised protagonist 
(such as the six sisters in The Path, who all have to meet “their” 
wolf in the form of an age­specific traumatic experience).
12 Laputa in Swift ’s Gulliver’s Travels (1726).
52 4. Thematic foregrounding: here we identify specific thematic 
elements in a narrative that recur, in various configurations, to 
form an idée fixe (for example, the relationship between time 
and human experience, in Braid, or the meta­ludic conflicts in 
The Stanley Parable).
5. Allegorical reading: here we understand unnatural structures 
as part of an extended metaphor about the human con­
dition, or the world in general. In this regard the impossibility 
of meaningful play in The Stanley Parable can be seen as an 
allegory of illusory agency (McCallum­Stewart and Parsler 
2007) in gameplay more generally.
6. Satirisation and parody: this occurs when narratives try to 
mock either other narratives or elements of the world in 
general; the zero­player game Progress Quest for example is 
unnatural in that it doesn’t allow players to do anything other 
than watch the game “play itself”, thereby parodying mas­
sively multiplayer online games (MMOGs) such as Everquest 
(and particularly their auto­attack function, which is extremely 
passive).
7. Positing a transcendental realm: here we attribute the 
unnatural to some kind of supernatural setting, for exmample 
heaven or hell (think of the god game, Black and White, where 
players have godlike powers over characters and are infiltrated 
by voices of good (an angelic character) and evil (a demonic 
guide).
8. Invitation to “free play”, where mutually contradictory 
storylines, or endings, are seen as an invitation to create one’s 
own story, which is a common feature of hypertext fiction, but 
we may well ask other players what their preferred ending of 
The Stanley Parable is, since we’re dealing with a game that 
thematises non­closure, multi­linearity, logical contradiction 
and cyclicality.
And yet we may just as well adopt an unnaturalising reading 
strategy (Nielsen 2013), in an attempt to accept the impossible 
as it is without trying to make sense of it. This approach goes 
53against “domesticating the unnatural” (Alber 2013a), and can be 
described in terms of a “Zen way of reading” (Alber 2013c, 83–84). 
We adopt the stoic position of simply leaving things unexplained 
and accepting the feeling of confusion, frustration, or discomfort 
that the narrative experience may evoke in us. 
Video Games as Unnatural Narratives
Having covered a lot of theory, let’s now turn to videogames as 
unnatural narratives. I was wondered, while writing, whether I 
should put a question mark on the title this essay, but I think it is 
fair to claim that in many ways games are unnatural narratives 
par excellence. Having said that, this proposition only holds true if 
we adopt a broad concept of unnaturalness as, for example, put 
forward by Alber (2013a), who defines it as that which is physically 
or logically impossible when measured against the foil of our 
real­world cognitive frames. In actual fact, we may go as far to 
say that under this definition the unnaturalness of games is what 
makes them so attractive to vast amounts of people around the 
world. The unnaturalness of games enables us to escape into 
realms of what’s normally thought to be humanly impossible or 
unthinkable. Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that games 
are perhaps the most readily “naturalising” media of all because 
they integrate in their procedural mechanics the very structures 
(unnatural or not) and “ecological” interactions (Linderoth 2011). 
Players are meant to internalise these structures and interactions 
as effectively as possible for fast progress through the game and 
to achieve high levels of satisfaction during play.
Clearly, mainstream videogames are full of physical impos­
sibilities. These are just a few examples: 
 – Respawning and rebirth are crucial replayability factors 
(violating the truth condition of singular mortality). 
 – Games thrive on using fantasy traditions from other 
media such as talking animals, monsters and other forms 
of non­human yet anthropomorphised creatures.
54  – Human or not, the anatomic dimensions of some hyper­
sexualised characters would be anatomically impossible 
in the real world (think of the early Lara Croft’s athletic 
abilities vis­à­vis her hyper­feminised physique).
 – Warping, or teleporting, between geographic areas is a 
standard form of fast in­game movement (violating the 
limitations of physical movement).
 – Similarly, there are highly dexterous types of movement 
in some games that are more akin to those of animals 
than human beings (think of the wall runs in Prince of 
Persia (1989), the jumping art of SuperMario (1985) and 
other platform characters, the superhumanly fast­paced 
balancing act of Mirror’s Edge and quite generally the fact 
that falling or jumping off high edges often doesn’t result 
in character death or even the slightest degree of harm). 
 – Multiple impersonations of one and the same player are a 
key attraction of role playing games (RPGs) and MMOGs: 
either synchronously (with more than one avatar of the 
same player in a game world simultaneously) or asyn­
chronously (anatomically shape­shifting avatars through 
customisation).
But games also exhibit a range of conventionalised logical 
impossibilities:
 – The fact that avatars are “us” in the game world makes 
them the interactional metaleptic tool par excellence 
(Ryan 2004b), yet metalepsis (in the sense of transgressing 
ontological boundaries, and especially those of fictional 
and actual worlds) is both physically and logically impos­
sible because we can’t all of a sudden lose our anatomic 
materiality; nor can we be in two places at the same time, 
especially if they’re in different time zones.
 – The success of a lot of games is based on the fact that they 
offer multiple and either contradictory or incompatible 
endings. Dragon Age: Origins (2009), for example, con­
verges (despite seemingly countless choices throughout) 
55to four endings (which is a comparably low number, 
incidentally). Each ending sees different characters ruling 
the game world, and some characters either dead or alive 
(which is a logical incompatibility).
So does all this mean that we should stop here and simply 
conclude that unnatural narratology doesn’t work with games 
because “video games as unnatural narratives” is a tautology? To 
me this would be slightly myopic because, clearly, when we look 
at Richardson’s anti­mimetically oriented conceptualisation and 
move beyond the conventionalised “unnatural” media­specificity 
of games, there’s actually quite a lot we can do with a specific 
type of game: games that seek to defamiliarise and innovate the 
gaming experience through highly idiosyncratic ludo­narrative 
mechanics.
So in a second move I would argue that some games are more 
“unnatural” (in a Richardsonian sense of aesthetically “more 
estranging”) than others because they deliberately violate the 
ludo­narrative conventions of their genre and the medium itself 
in order to evoke meta­ludic and meta­fictional reflections in 
the player – as well as other types of philosophical and critical 
processes. With this premise in mind, I shall now move on to the 
analytical part of this essay and demonstrate three aspects of 
unnaturalness at play: unnatural spatiality in The Path, unnatural 
temporality in Braid and unnatural narration in The Stanley 
Parable.
Unnatural Spatiality in The Path
According to Alber (2013a), “impossible spaces undo our 
assumptions about space and spatial organization in the real 
world”. So typical types of unnatural spaces include:
 – containers that are bigger on the outside than on the 
inside, or vice versa
 – shape­shifting settings
 – non­actualisable geographies
56  – visions of the infinite and unimaginable universe
 – metaleptic jumps between different ontological spheres.
What interests me most here is how the impossible, in the sense 
of anti­mimetic spatial design, contributes to reflexivity, and one 
game where this can be shown quite nicely is Tale of Tales’s The 
Path. 
The Path is a short horror game in which the adolescent female 
characters we can choose to play are exposed to different types 
of trauma – tailored to their age. The game world and our inter­
action with it is designed in such a way as to evoke horror and 
premonitions of what may happen. Such contemplative affects 
are partly created through slow movement through the game 
world (it ’s impossible to run for more than a few seconds and the 
forest of the game world seems endless, which is augmented by 
a wrap­around structure that causes the player to move in cir­
cles). Whenever a girl meets her wolf (and experienced spiritual 
death as a result), she ends up lying in front of her grandmother’s 
house, which on the outside looks fairly small. As she enters the 
house, however, it becomes gigantic, and the semi­cut­scene 
after her “fall” takes us through seemingly endless corridors with 
countless doors and huge rooms displaying objects evocative of 
her nightmarish experience. So the logically impossible spatial 
dimensions of the house (the incompatibility between out­
side and inside) can be read in terms of Alber’s subjectification 
strategy (the attribution of unnaturalness to internal states; 
trauma in this case).13 
Another interesting element of unnatural spatiality is the treat­
ment of paratext vis­à­vis the game world: the girls’ journals, 
retrievable from the game’s official website, read very much 
like they’ve been written by the fictional characters. However, 
numerous real­world comments have been posted by players 
13 Another way of understanding this spatial incompatibility would be in terms 
of positing a transcendental realm (Alber 2013c) – that of some kind of highly 
unsettling afterlife. 
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fictional characters, creating an ontological blurring between 
the player’s actual world and the fictional world of the game. In 
fact, this occurrence of interactional metalepsis (or transgression 
between logically distinct ontological spheres) adds to the eerie 
but also philosophical and reflective atmosphere of the game. We 
accept the unnaturalness of this design feature because we can 
read the game as an allegory (one of Alber’s (2013b) strategies) of 
the trials and tribulations of young women, and this allows our 
actual world and the game world to converge.
Unnatural Temporality in Braid
My second analysis focuses on unnatural temporality. In an essay 
on temporal paradoxes in narrative, Ryan (2009, 142) proposes 
four core intuitive human beliefs about time:
1. Time flows, and it does so in a fixed direction.
2. You cannot fight this flow and go back in time.
3. Causes always precede their effects.
4. The past is written once for all.
In fiction, of course, at least some of these dictums are regularly 
subverted, for example, in time­travel narratives or postmodern, 
multi­linear, filmic narratives such as Groundhog Day (1993) or 
Run Lola Run (1998). Hence, some elements of (fictional) unnatural 
temporality have already been conventionalised depending 
on individual levels of exposure and culture­specific media 
ecologies.
According to Alber (and his broad definition of unnaturalness), 
“unnatural temporalities [which revolve around Ryan’s principles] 
challenge our real­world ideas about time and temporal progres­
sion” (2013a). So for this study we need to add the assumption of 
anti­mimetic defamiliarisation as part of the developer’s intent.
Typical unnatural temporalities (Richardson 2002) include: 
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everyday life are reversed (for example, in Martin Amis’s 
1991 novel Time’s Arrow)
 – eternal temporal loops/circular temporalities, where the 
narrative, or a character, seems to be going round in cir­
cles (a common feature of hypertext fiction)
 – conflated time lines (or “chronomontages”), which con­
join different temporal zones, such as the time traveller 
landing in the historical past (for example, Kevin from 
Time Bandits (Gilliam 1981), catapulted into Ancient 
Greece, in his own contemporary clothes, taking photos 
with his Polaroid camera)
 – reversed causalities, where the present is caused by 
the future, like in D. M. Thomas’s The White Hotel (1981) 
where the protagonist’s pain is caused by an anticipatory 
projection of a future event
 – contradictory temporalities, in which there are mutually 
exclusive events or sequences, for example, in Coover’s 
1969 short story “The Babysitter”, where Mr. Tucker both 
did and did not go home to have sex with the babysitter
 – differential time lines, such as different aging speeds 
between characters like in Virginia Woolf’s Orlando (1928)
 – multiple time lines, plotlines that begin and end at the 
same time yet take different periods of time to unfold, for 
example, in Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream 
(c1590).
A game that embeds a number of unnatural temporalities quite 
firmly and unavoidably in its mechanics is Jonathan Blow’s Braid. 
It ’s a 2D platform game where the protagonist, Tim, is on a quest 
to save the Princess, beg her forgiveness and live happily ever 
after (although we later learn that she doesn’t actually want 
him). The game as a whole can be read as an allegory of the 
Trinity nuclear bomb test of 1945, which directly preceded the 
destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
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of the game can meaningfully be read as an allegory (see Alber’s 
reading strategies) of the irreversibility of human action and 
suffering, while the mechanics seem to suggest that the rules of 
temporal logic can be lifted by Faustian ambitions.
Each world in Braid has its own impossible temporal mechanics, 
which have to be internalised by players (against their real­world 
and genre­specific assumptions) in order to be successful. I’ll only 
mention three examples here:
 – Retrogressive temporality. You can go back in time in exact 
reversed order by holding the shift key (and speed up the 
time as needed); hence Tim can “un­die” (rather than res­
pawn) indefinitely, and indeed certain achievements only 
become possible through this rewind function.
 – Reversed causality (which goes against the principle that 
causes always precede their effects). In world three (Time 
and Mystery), the player’s actions can be rewound whilst 
other elements in the game world remain unaffected by 
the reversal. For example, using the rewind function, a key 
can be brought back to the immediate past (without losing 
the key) to open a door that otherwise wouldn’t be pos­
sible to open because Tim would be stuck forever in a pit 
that he’s jumped into to grab the key.
 – Differential timelines. In world six (Hesitance), the player 
can slow down time to get certain things done – time 
moves slower in the proximity of the all­important ring, 
marked with a halo, enabling Tim to, for example, escape 
certain monsters while either he or they are in a time 
warp, or to manipulate the velocity of moving objects, 
such as clouds, to facilitate forward movement.
Unnatural Narration in The Stanley Parable
Finally, I’d like to examine an instance of unnatural narration. 
Again, unnatural narration can quite simply be any physically 
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baby, a human bodily organ, a plant or object. Or it can, and in my 
mind more powerfully so, manifest itself in unconventionalised 
forms of extreme narration, such as second­person narration, 
multiperson narration, certain forms of unreliable narration 
and de­narration (a narrator’s negation of previously stated or 
assumed truths; see Richardson (2006) for a comprehensive 
overview). Strangely or not, omniscient, or authorial narration is 
also generally held to be unnatural, largely because no­one can 
possibly know as much as a standard omniscient narrator tends 
to, and the fascination associated with this paradox is reflected in 
recent fictional creativity beyond print, as my example will show.
What’s important to note here is that unnatural narration in 
games is in itself tautological. A narrator, or narrative voice telling 
the story, is impossible in videogames because it would subvert 
or hinder the player’s decision­making process in the game world, 
as well as their individualised emergent experiences.
The game I’m going to look at, The Stanley Parable by Davey 
Wreden/Galactic Café (the remake version of 2013), experiments 
with this paradox by employing an intriguing type of unnatural 
narration – a shape­shifting, intrusive narrator whose would­
be omniscience is deconstructed by the player’s subversive 
behaviour. The game stages combat between player and narrator. 
The narrator, as it turns out, isn’t as empowered and omniscient 
as he pretends to be, and is ultimately at the mercy of the player 
and, of course, the essence of the gameplay and its impact on the 
narrative design. By the same token, we as players are confronted 
with the limitations of our own agency as even the choices we can 
make are pre­scripted. 
At this juncture, let me say a few words about omniscient 
narration. It was the standard form of realistic storytelling in 
nineteenth­century realism, was then superseded by reflector 
mode and internal narrative styles in literary modernism (for 
example James Joyce and Virginia Wolf) and has more recently, 
61in twenty­first­century fiction, seen a revival, yet in very different 
forms that reflect the impossibility of godlike or representative 
knowledge or insight. Writers such as Zadie Smith, Salman 
Rushdie and Martin Amis have been experimenting with more 
vulnerable, fragmented, confessional forms of authorial narration 
that reflect both a crisis of fiction writing and, at the same time, 
the ambition to create new forms of literary authority and 
thereby regain cultural capital vis­à­vis popular culture (Dawson 
2013). So if, in The Stanley Parable, we are confronted with an 
experimental battle between would­be omniscient narrator and 
player­character, we have to see this design as a reflection of 
two current trends: (a) the media­ecological crisis and cultural 
ambitions of twenty­first­century fiction writing, and: (b) the 
literary gaming movement that’s been evolving over the past 15 
years or so. 
According to its official site, The Stanley Parable is “an exploration 
of story, games, and choice. Except the story doesn’t matter, 
it might not even be a game, and if you ever actually do have a 
choice, well let me know how you did it” (Mularcyzk, n.d.). So what 
the game tries to get across is the question of how much agency 
and choice players actually have in a game and that agency is 
ultimately illusory (MacCallum­Stewart and Parsler 2007) given 
that choices, paths and endings tend to be pre­coded. We also 
learn through procedural rhetoric that subversiveness on the 
part of the player is a sine qua non to escape from illusory agency, 
which makes cheating not simply a legitimate but indeed a rec­
ommended form of player engagement.
The protagonist is Stanley, an office worker in a Kafkaesque 
corporate, bureaucratic environment, who pushes buttons upon 
command, day­in, day­out. Initially Stanley, played in the first­
person, sets out on his quest to find out what’s happened to his 
co­workers, who have all disappeared. The narrator accompanies 
him on his way throughout, giving instructions as to where to go 
next yet not in a directive, command form, but in the past tense 
indicative, thereby making propositions about what Stanley did 
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where he might go. Whereas in a film or print narrative, past 
tense indicative narration is the accepted, default standard of 
storytelling, in a game it completely goes against the grain and 
seems patronising at best. This makes us, as players, suspicious 
about the reliability or trustworthiness of the narrator right 
from the outset, and the more we attempt to deviate from the 
narrator’s propositions, the more stand­offish and annoyed he 
becomes, so much so that in some extremely deviant endings his 
comments, behaviour and designs suggest frustration, despair, 
resignation, or even madness. 
The narrator (or implied author) becomes our main enemy in the 
game because there aren’t really any further major obstacles or 
enemies to overcome. This battle between implied author (man­
ifested in the choices built into the game) and the player who 
strives to undermine his or her “implied” counterpart (personified 
by the conformist, Stanley) is orchestrated in at least 18 different 
paths or endings.
In what follows, I’m going to briefly look at three of them to dem­
onstrate the transformation of the narrator’s projected authority. 
First, the life ending, which follows the path of maximum con­
formism and obedience; secondly, the choice, or real person 
ending, where you unplug a phone that you were supposed to 
answer; and thirdly, the museum ending, which adds another 
ontological sphere, or diegetic level, to the game world, lifting the 
story experienced so far onto a symbolic or allegorical plane.
The main decision players have to make for Stanley is at a set 
of two doors, where the “correct” path is left and the “deviant” 
path is right (paradoxically or not). Stanley can still “go wrong” 
after taking the “right” door, and very drastically so, going by 
the narrator’s perplexed reactions. If the player follows all the 
narrator’s propositions precisely, in the life ending, they’ll be 
rewarded with a “win”. Stanley switches off the controls in the 
Orwellian Mind Control Facility and steps out into the open. 
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two­fold: by the ensuing cut­scene, which leaves the player pas­
sively watching and listening to the narrator’s freedom mono­
logue on Stanley’s alleged “happiness”; and by the fact that, after 
the cut­scene the player is sent straight back to the beginning, 
that is, to Stanley’s office, with the interspersed loading message 
“the end is never the end”, suggesting that they’re supposed to 
explore the paths of deviance or defiance.
Fig. 1 shows the diegetic levels of the game world as evoked by the 
life ending. The big box contains the diegetic, or fictional space of 
the game, with the intradiegetic, or character level embedded in 
the narrator’s diegesis. We as players are extradiegetic or outside 
the story, but since we implement the narrator’s story, which 
he tells to a narratee on his level, by steering Stanley, we’re also 
inevitably part of the game world. Therefore the membranes 
between the levels, or spheres, are shown as semi­permeable: we 
can see that there are a lot of metaleptic cross­overs happening 
already, even though the narrator isn’t actually addressing us 
directly (which he does in other endings).
Narrator
Diegetic
Extradiegetic
Intradiegetic
Stanley
Player
Narratee 
Fig. 1: Diegetic levels of The Stanley Parable life ending.
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is the choice, or real person ending. Here the player opts to 
unplug a phone that Stanley was supposed to answer, thereby 
undertaking an action not contained within the narrator’s script. 
This act of transgression causes the narrator to sense that there’s 
someone else behind Stanley’s incorrect behaviour, and after first 
addressing Stanley and realising Stanley couldn’t possibly have 
devised such an act, he turns to the implied player thus: 
Oh no, no, no! Did you just unplug the phone? That wasn’t 
supposed to be a choice. How did you do that? You actually 
chose incorrectly, but I didn’t even know that was possible. 
Let me double­check [shuffling his papers around yet finding 
no evidence of this choice in his script] … I don’t understand. 
How on earth are you making meaningful choices? What 
did you … Wait a second … How had I not noticed it sooner? 
You’re not Stanley. You’re a real person. I can’t believe I was 
so mistaken. This is why you’ve been able to make correct 
and incorrect choices, and to think I’ve been letting you run 
around in this game for so long! If you’d made any more 
wrong choices you might have negated it entirely. It ’s as 
though you’d completely ignored even the most basic safety 
protocol for real­world decision­making. I’m going to stop the 
game for a moment so we can educate you properly on safe 
decision making.
This is followed by a satirical educational video about the life­
threatening potential of human decision­making. So in this 
instance the narrator breaks the fourth wall and moves the met­
aleptic interaction onto an (implied) extra­diegetic level. Another 
observation that can be made here is that this particular ending 
shows how indirect communication works between the devel­
oper and the player outside the fictional world (extra­diegetically; 
marked by the dotted arrow in Fig. 2), as we learn that the 
narrator is not responsible for the phone that can be unplugged 
as a pre­programmed choice. So here the actual author 
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communicates implicitly with the actual player, who implements 
the communicated option intra­diegetically.
Interestingly, as the camera returns to the game world and 
the room with the telephone, we find the space transformed 
into a postmodern pastiche (Fig. 4), and the narrator says, “Ah 
welcome back! You may have noticed that this room has begun to 
deteriorate as a result of narrative contradiction” and, “We just 
need to get you home as soon as possible before the narrative 
contradiction gets any worse. Unfortunately it seems this place 
is not well equipped to deal with reality”. So here the narrator 
himself explicates the anti­mimetic, logical impossibilities 
embedded in the game’s narrative design.
Developer/author
Narrator
Diegetic
Extradiegetic
Intradiegetic
Stanley
Player
Narratee 
Fig. 2: Diegetic levels as suggested by the Choice Ending.
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Finally, in the museum ending, Stanley meets his intra­diegetic 
death after choosing to take the escape route, branching off the 
“correct” track to the Mind Control Facility. He’s killed by some 
kind of machine, yet again we find that the game goes on and the 
player (now playing their own alter ego) finds him or herself in a 
fictional developer’s museum, which exhibits all sorts of in­game 
props and concept art. Strikingly, here we encounter another 
narrator, a female voice, which seems to be superordinate to the 
diegesis of the initial male narrator, who now seems to have dis­
appeared along with Stanley. The female narrator comments on 
the paradoxical love­hate relationship between player­character 
and narrator and advises the player to stop the game to put an 
end to the endless, meaningless cycle of “walking someone else’s 
path”. And here, finally, is where the player’s alter ego in the game 
dies, crushed by the “metal jaws”. After this ending players have 
Developer/author
Narrator	[2]
Narrator	1	(disappeared)
Metadiegetic
Extradiegetic
Intradiegetic
Stanley	(dead)
Player
Narratee	[2]	/
Implied Player
Diegetic
Narratee	[2]	
Fig. 3: Diegetic levels as suggested by the Choice Ending.
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to physically reload the game by starting again from the main 
menu.
In Fig. 4 we can see that another level of diegesis, call it meta­
diegesis, has been added to the ontological universe of the game, 
and the female narrator speaks to us directly as implied players. 
Interestingly, though, although the female super­narrator seems 
to be more empowered than the male narrator in the other 
endings, she is equally subject to the player’s choices (and of 
course the game design). She frantically tries to prevent the 
player from having his or her alter ego killed in the game world, 
and from endlessly perpetuating the cycle of following pre­
designed paths and subjection to illusory agency.
To wrap up this analysis, The Stanley Parable ’s procedural rhetoric 
reinforces the decoding strategy suggested by its title (a parable 
is an educational allegory). As players we are made to read it as 
an allegory of illusory agency built into games to give players the 
illusion of choice, power and control. In fact, we as players are all 
Fig. 4: Postmodern telephone room in the choice ending.
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tically subject ourselves to the constraints set by the games we 
play, except of course when we cheat – and this is where we have 
the power to “defeat” the implied author­programmer.
Concluding Remarks
To sum up the main insights I’ve drawn from this research so far, 
if we want to move toward an unnatural ludo­narratology, there 
are several things to be aware of and take into account. First, 
not every definition of unnaturalness is useful for close game 
analysis, but if we take anti­mimeticism and defamiliarisation 
– for the sake of entertainment, flow, innovation and critical 
reflection – as a starting point, we can begin to make sense of the 
kinds of “unnatural structures” that feature, for example, in meta­
games like The Stanley Parable, or generally in games that push 
the boundaries of ludo­narrative design.
Second, the “naturalising” and “unnaturalising” reading strategies 
put forward by Alber (2013b) and Nielsen (2013) are useful starting 
points, yet they have to be augmented by game­specific ways 
of making sense of what Jesper Juul (2005, 132) calls “incoherent 
worlds”, that is, by explaining unnaturalness in terms of the rules 
of the game. Furthermore, there’s still a lot of work to be done on 
studying players’ individual nuances in understanding unnatural 
ludo­narrative structures and their underlying and resulting play 
styles and strategies. Closer insights into these processes can 
only be gained through empirical player research.
Finally, I’d propose an inductive approach to developing a 
medium­specific toolkit for unnatural ludo­narrative structures, 
taking into account the multiple ways in which game mechanics 
allow us to execute procedural rhetoric to “read” design features, 
such as illusory agency, slow gaming, action reversal and 
character duplication, functionally and with a view to gaining a 
deeper understanding of videogames as a narrative art. 
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Is Hacking the Brain the 
Future of Gaming?
An interview with Karen Palmer 
Among the four keynote speakers at DiGRA2015 was digital artist and 
film maker Karen Palmer. On May 16, in her talk “Is Hacking the Brain 
the Future of Gaming?”, she presented the neurogame SYNCSELF 2 in 
which the player’s thoughts are read and transferred onto an avatar. 
In a short interview, she explains what the “diversity of play” means 
to her and talks about the aesthetic potential of combining film and 
games.
Question: You have developed, and are about to develop, new 
and innovative formats that combine film with perform­
ance, parkour running, and games. Your performance/game 
SYNCSELF 2 is an interactive movie that can be performed or 
navigated by electric signals retrieved from the brain of the 
player or “interactor”. Whenever the interactor focuses and 
is not distracted by the visuals of the film, the audience, or 
by his or her diverting thoughts, the characters of the film 
succeed in their attempt to overcome parkour hurdles. When 
the interactor loses focus, the characters of the film fail. Is 
this a film you directed or is it a game you designed?
74 Karen Palmer: It is both: interactive film and a game. You watch 
the film and you play the game. 
Q:  It seems fair to say that it is not only the content of your 
projects, but also the media you embed your pieces within, 
are highly diverse. The title of DiGRA2015 was “Diversity of 
Play: Games – Cultures – Identities”. What does “diversity of 
play” actually mean for you?
KP:  Diversity of play means playing in many different formats 
and genres to create an innovative audience journey through 
a gaming experience. 
Q:  How did your personal journey arrive at the crossroads of 
parkour and interactive film?
KP:  In 2009 I became a committed forerunner and, inspired by 
my passion for parkour, I was encouraged to “move through 
fear”, not just while training but within my life. I left the 
security of a successful career as a creative director and 
music video director to pursue my passion to be a visual 
artist and develop my voice as a storyteller. 
 As a result, I have developed my own unique interactive 
transmedia experiences that innovatively fuse well­being 
with art, film, parkour and gaming experiences through tech 
and storytelling to create an experience where the user is the 
remote control and the action is completely dependent on 
the psychological state of the user. My objective is to inspire 
and empower the user through storytelling.
Q:  Much of your work is located at the intersection of visual art, 
interactive film and gaming. How would you describe the 
(aesthetic) potentials of combining film and games?
KP:  The aesthetic potentials of combining film and gaming offer 
an exciting opportunity to create a fully immersive cinematic 
experience.
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 Transforming film from a purely linear journey, of which 
the director is the sole author, into a journey with multiple 
potential story structures of which the audience is the con­
troller of the experience. This approach creates a bespoke, 
personalised and highly satisfying journey for the viewer/
player.
 Unlike animation, film is a more visual reality­based gaming 
experience so the type of immersion into this world possess 
a different set of dynamics and therefore has the potential to 
be a more powerful journey. 
Q:  SYNCSELF 2, to name one of your last projects, combines 
“neurogaming” with film. What exactly does the term mean 
and how do neurogaming techniques transform the gaming 
experience?
KP:  Neurogaming is where your mind and body meet game 
play. It is about integrating one’s full nervous system into 
the gaming experience for the purposes of entertainment, 
health, education, wellness and more.
 Neurogame developers are using the latest emotional, 
cognitive, sensory and behavioural technologies to create 
76 radically compelling experiences to engage and entertain 
gamers worldwide. 
Q:  From your point of view, what are the risks and opportunities 
of the more and more blurred distinctions between games 
and non­games?
KP:  I am not aware of any potential risks, however, I see a lot of 
potential opportunities. New forms of learning and self­
development through an engaging format. The experience 
enables the user to develop self, and gain practical cognitive 
skills such as focus, enabling the user to become more 
productive through a training experience. Acquiring real 
world skills through this unique form of “entertainment­
meets­gaming” will enable the user to understand their 
strengths and weakness better.
 There are quite a few examples of pieces that build upon 
interactive gaming experiences. To mention just a few, recent 
developments include:
 SYNCSELF 2 created an environment for the user where they 
are able to explore the concept of self. The user then became 
aware of process of focus. As a result they were then able to 
access it at will. 
 SuperBetter is another application that helps you achieve 
your health goals — or recover from an illness or injury — by 
increasing your personal resilience. Resilience means staying 
curious, optimistic and motivated even in the face of the 
toughest challenges. 
Q:  Karen, could you please give one more example here?
KP: Nevermind is a biofeedback­enhanced adventure horror 
game that takes you into the dark and twisted world of the 
subconscious.
 As you explore surreal labyrinths and solve the puzzles of 
the mind, a biofeedback sensor will monitor how scared or 
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fears get the best of you, the game will become harder. If 
you’re able to calm yourself in the face of terror, the game 
will be more forgiving.
 Nevermind strives to create a haunting gameplay experience 
that also teaches you how to be more aware of your internal 
responses to stressful situations. If you can learn to control 
your anxiety within the disturbing realm of Nevermind, just 
imagine what you can do when it comes to those inevitable 
stressful moments in the real world …
Q:  In science fiction, plugging into the brain has often quite 
evil connotations. I can see from your artwork that the 
actors/runners/players look quite happy with what you do 
with them, but could you imagine ethical problems with 
neurogaming?
KP: Neurogaming is where the mind and body meet game play. 
It ’s where your full nervous system is integrated into the 
gaming experience by using new sensor technologies, output 
systems, and game design techniques.
 I do not envisage any ethical issues at this time, as it is 
merely another form of evaluating data, which is becoming 
all the more pervasive in society.
Q:  Can you give us a description of your forthcoming piece 
FUTURESELF?
KP:  FUTURESELF will build upon the success of SYNCSELF 2 and has 
the potential to create an even more significant impact cul­
turally through a more precise user experience. FUTURESELF 
will build upon this functionality to measure the vibrational 
frequency that we as humans transmit. 
Q:  Karen, what is “vibrational frequency”? Can you please 
explain in a few sentences?
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KP:  FUTURESELF will monitor the vibrational, emotional, and 
mental frequency that the user is operating at and, through 
the immersive storytelling experience, be guided to raise 
their vibrational level. The process of interacting with the 
installation will improve the user’s sense of awareness 
and increase their sense of mindfulness enabling them to 
become their “future self” through the experience. The 
functionality will be both a solo and multi­player experience, 
where two players are able to compete to become their 
“future self”.
Q: Thank you very much for the interview.


Navigating Uncertainty: 
Ludic Epistemology  
in an Age of  
New Essentialisms
Markus Rautzenberg
Like for Freud, psychoanalysis for Lacan was always more than 
just a catalogue of curing methods for illnesses of the mind but 
also about human existence as a whole. In his famous talk at the 
Catholic University of Louvain, that was in part published in the 
TV documentary Jacques Lacan parle (1972), one of his claims is as 
simple as it is radical: he suggests that there is no such thing as 
certainty, not even in death. 
But what does this really mean? Isn’t death (and taxes one might 
add) the only entity in life that is unavoidable? Isn’t it absurd 
to propose that we can’t be sure of death? What he means, of 
course, is that it is certain that we will die but that we live as 
if that was not the case. Not because we decide to do so, or 
because of some narcissistic hubris, but because the certainty 
of death is, in itself, a belief and a system of faith because our 
psychological system cannot empirically experience its own anni­
hilation. Sure, we see people (fictional and real) die almost every 
day in the media and, depending on our profession or as soon as 
we reach a certain age, it also becomes part of our personal life. 
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death, or to be more precise, we don’t know our own death. 
Death is a barrier for our psyche that we cannot overcome. In an 
abstract way we know that we must die of course, but we don’t 
know it in an actual way in the same sense that we know what it is 
like to be hungry or how it feels to be tired for example. Our own 
death is something that is, in an existential sense, not knowable, 
because it is a mode of existence, that – obviously – cannot be 
experienced as such. 
Lacan proposes that instead of experiencing death there is simply 
a belief that death exists and that we don’t live for all eternity. 
The function of this belief, it ’s structuring mechanism, is as 
paradoxical as it may sound: hope and consolation. Hope in the 
finitude of suffering, of futility or absurdity. Consolation in the 
fact that one day whatever is currently happening to us as an 
individual or as a species will come to an end. 
To sum it up: according to Lacan our relationship to death is 
actually the opposite of what we normally believe. One of our 
most intimate and crushing states of existential fear (when, for 
example, we wake up at night with the thought “I am going to 
die” appearing suddenly out of nowhere), is not intimate or per­
sonal at all. It is a structuring system of faith, a concept, coming 
from the outside, whose purpose is not to frighten us, but on the 
contrary, to make life bearable. The problem is not that there is 
death but that deep down we assume that we are immortal. And this 
delusion is what is really destructive. Without it, nobody would 
smoke or take drugs (or wage wars for that matter). But without 
it, we probably wouldn’t be human. Consequently, it is not the 
fear of death that is specific to us as a species, it is our delusion of 
immortality. 
It is easy to see that these two notions – the delusion of 
immortality on the one hand and, on the other, death as a belief 
system to keep the latter in check – are in conflict. So what is 
the purpose of explaining all this? The point is that uncertainty 
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the world we think we can take for granted is, at least for our 
psychological reality, not certain at all. Death (and life for that 
matter) are concepts that structure the psyche from the out­
side, that we assume and internalise like other famous Lacanian 
categories such as the imaginary and the symbolic, because 
death belongs to the realm of the real; it is the outer limit of our 
existence. 
So we don’t know death, we just know of it. That means that even 
death isn’t certain, because what do we really know? Don’t we all 
get much older nowadays? In the so­called “first­world” countries, 
life expectancies are constantly rising and who knows what will 
be in 30 or 50 years. As we all know, just a little over one hundred 
years ago, you could die from the flu. You could have to work so 
hard you could die of exhaustion before the age of 30. Today, to 
conceive of death, we must think of it as being caused by rare or 
extreme events, like cancer or fatal accidents. Meanwhile trans­
humanism is hard at work to bring us some form of immortality. 
This kind of relentless uncertainty that doesn’t exclude 
death seems to be the condition of contemporary western 
societies. Structuralism and especially post­structuralism 
were philosophies that embraced this notion and pushed 
its theoretical implications to their limits, to a point where 
countermeasures where eventually inevitable: countermeasures 
that emerged from within post­structuralism itself. The 
apocalyptic cultural pessimism of Jean Baudrillard or Paul 
Virillo for example, who claimed that we live in an age of total 
simulation in which everything real has dissolved into media 
technologies, is a logical albeit conservative answer to a world 
without transcendental signifiers. The modification in their 
theoretical approach was subtle but important: they accepted 
the status quo of absolute uncertainty as a given but undermined 
the radicalism of the notion with the implication that a world 
of meaning and representations of the real has been lost. But 
having lost something is still better than the idea there was never 
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these countermeasures have emerged: how else can we live 
under conditions of permanent uncertainty? 
In this context, new essentialisms have come to the fore with full 
force (and I am not even talking about Islamism or other kinds 
of religious or political fundamentalisms). The all­encompassing 
postmodern uncertainty I just sketched out is demonised as a 
kind of corrosion or corruption of the spirit, mind and morality. 
Just take a look at religious fundamentalisms’ counterpart: the 
popular “new atheist” movement and its protagonists, such as 
Richard Dawkins or the late Christopher Hitchens. Books like The 
God Delusion (Dawkins 2006), or God is Not Great: How Religion 
Poisons Everything by Hitchens (2007), can’t hide the fact that in 
their radical narrow­mindedness they do exactly the same as 
their declared enemies. They just swap one belief system (in the 
Lacanian sense) for another, unable to deal with what frightens 
them most: uncertainty. And to be perfectly clear about it: even 
though I took Lacan as a starting point, psychoanalysis is, of 
course, one of the most powerful “belief systems” modernity has 
ever come up with. There are no privileged perspectives here, 
just points of departure. 
There are aspects of neuroscience and genetics that have become 
a kind of belief system, not in the sense of an illusion (that is, of 
course, the punch­line of Lacan’s argumentation: “belief systems” 
are as real and powerful as it gets), but as a coping mechanism, 
protecting us from the insolence of uncertainty. Everyone knows, 
especially neuroscientists, that colouring areas of brain scans 
doesn’t bring us any closer to understanding the brain, that those 
pictures are not photographic in nature but algorithm­filtered 
visualisations, and that the idea of photographic truth is used as 
persuasive rhetoric to produce evidence where there is none. 
In the firm belief that one day the right connections will even­
tually be made, data­driven research – the sciences’ dernière crie 
– analyses the enormous amount of data digital­media are able 
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occurrences but as a kind of new “book of nature” that is thought 
to have the potential to someday reveal scientific truth. This is 
teleological, religious thinking and there is nothing inherently 
wrong with it as long as one doesn’t claim that it is the opposite. 
In philosophy and the humanities, non­ontological, post­
metaphysical ideas seem to be in a state of decline since the 
death of Jacques Derrida who, a few years before his death, was 
accused of “relativism” by none other than Cardinal Ratzinger (the 
later Pope Benedikt XVI). The accusation was that by claiming that 
there is no “transcendental signifier”, no stable core of truth at 
the centre of our sign­systems, Derrida and with him the whole 
of postmodernity, had devalued every religion, political theory 
and moral system there is, pushing humanity into an intellec­
tually and morally devastating wasteland of “anything goes” that, 
according to Ratzinger at least, is the blight of modernity. 
Today, neo­metaphysical movements in philosophy and the 
humanities (our obsessions with material culture, speculative 
realism or our new found love for big holistic theories that try 
to follow Hegel in their systematic aspirations), may very well be 
understood someday as expressions of the desire to overcome 
the constructivisms of the twentieth century and to re­establish a 
connection with the “real”.
And isn’t there some truth to this? For example, isn’t global 
capitalism – governed by a fear of uncertainty in the guise of 
mathematical game theory – showing what it is like when there is 
nothing certain but uncertainty itself? At its core, economic game 
theory tries to cope with the old provocation of uncertainty, 
mathematically this time, exactly like our other “belief systems” 
let us cope with death. Trying to predict how economic actors 
behave in relation to other actors is what the algorithms of the 
global economy are designed for. Since John von Neumann’s first 
paper on the subject this “belief system” has been called game 
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theory of strategic decision­making is all about. 
But this kind of thinking is well­known; it is the rationale of 
wartime. Trying to domesticate uncertainty at all costs means 
assuming that we live in a state of constant threat. As we all 
know, that is the state we live in within a globalised society – a 
state of fear. Fear of the next terrorist attack, fear of losing your 
job, fear of not being attractive, intelligent or emotionally resilient 
enough etc. There are many books on the intricacies of the 
“culture of fear”.
It is only a small step from fear to paranoia, and at this point 
we enter the realm of insanity. It sets in when, in navigating 
uncertainty, we are tipped off balance, when our belief systems 
don’t work anymore and no longer provide us with the delusion 
of immortality. Lacan’s story about his patient and her rêve pas-
calien exemplifies this. The dream, where existence is infinitely 
regenerated out of itself (“l’existence régénérai toujours d’elle 
même” ), is pure wish fulfilment, piggybacking on the delusion 
of immortality mentioned before, unleashed from the shackles 
of the concept of death. What at first glance may seem like an 
innocent dream appears as a nightmare, leaving the dreamer 
“half mad” in the process. 
What Lacan could only anticipate, however, is that in computer 
games his Pascalian dream, the insanity of the delusion of 
immortality, has become an everyday practice made pos­
sible by digital media: I am of course referring to the savepoint 
or, to formulate it closer to Lacans’ presentation, the idea of 
respawning. 
The concept behind respawning is one of the most important and 
defining features of digital media and all the more for computer 
games in which this kind of time­axis manipulation, as Friedrich 
Kittler would have called it, is something that no computer game 
can exist without. The only way to remove this feature would 
be to design a game that destroys itself after use, deleting its 
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the feature, like some puzzle games. The Pascalian dream of 
infinite regeneration has been implemented in many ways and 
recently quite cleverly in a coming­of­age adventure with the 
very appropriate title, Life is Strange (2015). Here, the hero is an 
adolescent girl in her first week at a new school. As if this wasn’t 
scary enough, she (and the player) discover they can manipulate 
time, and not just through the medium of photography – a topic 
that is regularly reflected upon during the game – but in the 
diegetic world of the game. Within the game, it opens possibilities 
teenagers could only dream of. The genius of the game lies in 
its reflection on the mediality of computer games through two 
lenses that are also intertwined in the game world: photography 
and the trials and tribulations of puberty. 
Being able to say exactly the right thing at the right time would 
certainly be a massive boost to a teenagers’ fragile self­con­
fidence but this is, of course, still borne out of fear; the fear of 
uncertainty. Computer games work so well because they provide 
relief from uncertainty while at the same time work in the very 
medium of uncertainty itself: games and play (I will elaborate 
on this shortly). This paradoxical coincidence leads us back to 
the realm of insanity. From Planescape Torment (1999) to The 
Suffering (2004), from Manhunt (2003) to Eternal Darkness, from 
Sanitarium (1998) to Silent Hill (1999) and Heavy Rain (2010), from Psy-
chonauts (2005) to Papa y Yo (2012), since the very beginning of the 
medium there has been no end of tales of madness and insanity 
in computer games. And even in cases where insanity isn’t an 
explicit, central theme of the story, the dystopian worlds and hell­
ish, apocalyptical environments in a game like World of Warcraft 
(2004) can’t just point to a juvenile lust for blood and gore. 
In computer games we come to somehow enjoy insanity. Take, for 
example, a game like Bloodborne (2015), the latest in the infamous 
series of hardcore roleplaying games the Japanese developer 
From Soft has released since Demons Souls (2009). These games 
are a nightmare in every sense of the word. Not only is the overall 
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and oppressive as possible, with environments that feel like a 
Victorian version of a Hieronymus Bosch painting, but the game 
mechanics are downright punishing. As a game, Bloodborne and 
its brethren are a kind of antithesis to the trend of casual games. 
Yet at the same time these games are immensely successful. 
Why? Because in these games, computer games almost come in 
to their own or “to themselves”; because these games celebrate 
uncertainty and insanity at the same time, and result in a kind of 
“gaming bliss” only very few commercial games achieve. At the 
same time we all know that in a game like this there is no place 
for real uncertainty, because the design of such a game has to 
be very tight and every component must fit together, otherwise 
the result would be so frustrating, that the player wouldn’t want 
to continue. Games like Bloodborne are staging uncertainty; they 
revel in it without being able to provide real randomness and 
entropy, which would be a pre­requisite of true uncertainty.1 
But, again, in exactly what way are insanity, uncertainty and 
gaming connected such that the combination makes a hellish 
nightmare like this so enjoyable? Let’s take a hint from Alice 
because, like always, when in doubt, ask Lewis Carroll! 
After venturing through the looking glass, Alice enters a land 
of paradoxes and permanent metamorphosis. What may look 
ordinary and normal on first glance always turns into something 
different, into something unexpected, thus mirroring the 
experience of a child trying to make sense of the adult world, 
which, to the child, doesn’t make sense at all. It was Gilles Del­
euze who famously put together a comprehensive list of these 
1 Uncertainty as a key component for computer games has recently been 
re­examined by Greg Costikyan (2013) from the perspective of a game 
designer, providing many examples of how modes of uncertainty are and 
can be applied in computer game designs. Early stages of my own, more 
philosophical approach to the notion of uncertainty in computer games have 
first been published in: Spiegelwelt. Elemente einer Aisthetik des Bildschirm-
spiels (Rautzenberg 2002).  
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implementing them into a theory of meaning (1998). And there is 
a certain paradox that is the leitmotif of all of Alice’s adventures: 
a certain concurrence of “reality” and “fiction”, of actuality and 
virtuality. This simultaneousness is, of course, embodied by the 
mirror­twins Tweedledee and Tweedledum who at one point in 
Through the Looking Glass (Carroll 1912) want to teach Alice about 
the dreams of the Red King, who is peacefully snoring away under 
a tree:
‘He’s dreaming now’ said Tweedledee: ‘and what do you think 
he is dreaming about?’
Alice said, ‘Nobody can guess that.’
‘Why about you!’ Tweedledee exclaimed, clapping his hands 
triumphantly. ‘And if he left off dreaming about you, where 
do you suppose you’d be?’ 
‘Where I am now of course’ said Alice.
‘Not you!’ Tweedledee retorted contemptuously. ‘You’d be 
nowhere. Why, you’re only a sort of thing in his dream!’
‘If that there king was to wake’ added Tweedledum, ‘you’d go 
out – bang! – just like a candle!’
‘I shouldn’t!’ Alice exclaimed indignantly. ‘Besides, if I’m only 
a sort of thing in his dream, what are you, I should like to 
know?‹’
‘Ditto’ said Tweedledum.
‘Ditto, Ditto’ cried Tweedledee.
He shouted this so loud that Alice couldn’t help saying, 
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noise.’2
Alice’s hesitation is the result of an ontological and epis­
temological uncertainty. On the one hand she is denying the 
possibility of her being a non­real “sort of thing” that could vanish 
like the flame of a candle – “bang!” – if the Red King awakens. On 
the other hand, however, she would rather not take the risk of 
waking him, because, in the end, better safe than sorry, right?
At one point during the course of Metal Gear Solid – a game that 
the Japanese developer Konami released first on Sony’s Plays-
tation platform in 1998 – the player in the guise of the avatar and 
protagonist of the game, Solid Snake,3 encounters a villain named 
Psycho Mantis who – according to the in­game mythology – has 
“telepathic powers”. This encounter leads to a boss fight that 
“proves” the telepathic capabilities of Psycho Mantis in a sophis­
ticated way. If the player has played another game from Konami, 
for example Castlevania (1986), that has left traces in the form 
of “save games” on the memory­unit of the console, the game 
software of Metal Gear Solid is programmed to detect those save 
games discretely. 
The result of this within the game is a baffling display of Mantis’s 
“telepathic powers”, because it enables the virtual antagonist to 
refer directly to behavioral patterns and certain biases of the real 
player sitting in front of the monitor: “So, you like Castelvania? Ah, 
you have saved often. You are a prudent person”. But Mantis has 
even more tricks up his sleeve to further substantiate his claims 
of telepathy: the longer the fight lasts, the more he keeps talking 
to the player and not to his diegetic opponent. At one point he 
2 From Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland & Through the Looking Glass (Carroll 
2012, 158).
3 The narrative of the game revolves around a global conspiracy that the 
hero of the game has to stop by infiltrating the headquarters of a secret 
paramilitary organisation. The villains and protagonists of this virtual play 
all have codenames that link them to their shared past as parts of a secret 
governmental task­force called Fox Hound. 
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pad, on the floor so that Mantis can “take control” of the device. 
The controller then actually moves on the floor seemingly on its 
own. A simple trick, because the dual shock pad has two small 
motors that can cause vibrations inside the device. The trick is 
simple but effective, because the events “inside” the game seem 
to reach out into the real world. 
The connection between Alice and the user playing the boss 
fight in Metal Gear Solid is obvious: it is the simultaneousness of 
epistemic, logical and ontological layers that normally cannot 
coexist on the same plane of existence. Alice’s uncertainty 
regarding her own ontological status is similar to the one that 
occurs during the encounter with Psycho Mantis in Metal Gear 
Solid. For a short moment the line between dream and reality, 
virtuality and actuality gets blurred. Most importantly, there 
is no implicit hierarchy between these different planes; it is 
unclear which precedes the other. This moment of hesitation 
and uncertainty, however brief, results for Alice in an irrational 
fear of being annihilated by the awakening of the King and it is 
responsible for the bewilderment of the player who observes 
how a virtual character in a computer game suddenly seems to 
have power over a real object outside the game, thus being able 
to reach outside the screen and “beyond the looking glass”.
These moments of uncertainty may be brief but their inner 
dynamics are of great importance. Unlike Alice, Psycho Mantis 
seems to know that he is part of a fictional, virtual world, there­
fore the normally impenetrable threshold between fiction and 
reality seems to crumble. As Psycho Mantis stretches out of 
the diegetic framing of the computer game as a kind of ludic 
trompe l’oeil, different modes of existence seem to be coex­
isting that would otherwise be logically, as well as ontologically 
and epistemically, incompatible. It is the game as a medium that 
makes this possible and it was Gregory Bateson who defined play 
and games accordingly. 
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is rooted in the very structure that allows for moments of 
transgression of which the boss fight with Psycho Mantis is of 
course not the most complex but an effective example. Bateson 
analyses this aspect of game and play psychologically, utilising 
the analogy of primary and secondary processes of the psychic 
system,4 by developing a theory of game and play as media that 
are able to transcend these otherwise insurmountable barriers. 
These moments of transcending define the very mediality of 
game and play. While the mechanisms of the subconscious 
primary processes and the discursive secondary processes are 
normally incompatible with each other, game and play are able 
to transcend these barriers by mediating the ensuing paradoxes. 
“It therefore follows that the play frame as here used as an 
explanatory principle implies a special combination of primary 
and secondary processes” (Bateson 1972, 191). It is crucial 
that Bateson analyses game and play as media that are situ­
ated between different logical and epistemic layers, mediating 
between them, without ever synthesising them in a Hegelian­
dialectical sense. The paradoxes are not aufgehoben but set in 
motion. Ludic mediality is a dance of and with paradoxes. 
The dynamics of ludic mediality therefore create a logico­
epistemic twilight zone similar to a lucid dream where the 
dreamer is suddenly aware that he or she is dreaming. This 
specific kind of dream normally occurs within the short liminal 
space between sleep and awakening. As long as the dreamer is 
dreaming without being aware of his own state, the dream works 
within its own operational framing. Not only can the threshold 
to secondary processes not be transgressed, it cannot even be 
perceived as such from within the dream. The moment of lucid 
dreaming, however, suddenly enables the dreamer to draw 
meta­conclusions, which, according to Bateson, make framings 
perceivable. This, of course, was the crucial point of entry for 
4 Bateson uses Freudian terms here first developed in the Traumdeutung.
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there Bateson’s theory of framing helped to theorise second­ and 
third­order observers, which in turn was extremely important 
for cybernetics, radical constructivism and finally system theory. 
Therefore, it would be fitting to speak of games as framed 
uncertainties. “Framed” in the sense that Bateson and Goffman 
suggest and “framed” as in “incriminate” or “entrap”. On the one 
hand computer games are celebrations of uncertainty, on the 
other, this uncertainty is not real. It ’s just pretend uncertainty 
because computers have a problem with real randomness in so 
far as they can’t generate randomness due to their very nature as 
von Neumann architecture and Turing machines. This is a key dis­
tinction that separates computer games from other games. There 
are many forms of framed uncertainties but there is a certain 
edge to the notion when it comes to computer games because 
of their digital ontology. It almost seems as if there is a kind of 
longing for uncertainty, randomness and entropy in digital media 
that is articulated in computer games for us to explore. This kind 
of “double­framing” works by showing what is otherwise hidden. 
Self­reference in computer games is almost inevitable because 
of the density of framing problems within the medium, that is 
“framing the framer” (Butler 2009, 5–15)5 in a double­bind.
The question “Is this a dream?” points to this kind of meta­con­
clusion derived from the liminal state of the lucid dreamer, who is 
both within and outside of the dream. “He or she cannot, unless 
5 ”The frame that seeks to contain, convey, and determine what is seen 
(and sometimes, for a stretch, succeeds in doing precisely that) depends 
upon the conditions of reproducibility in order to succeed. And yet, this 
very reproducibility entails a constant breaking from context, a con­
stant delimitation of new context, which means that the ‘frame’ does not 
quite contain what it conveys, but breaks apart every time it seeks to give 
definitive organization to its content. In other words, the frame does not 
hold anything together in one place, but itself becomes a kind of perpetual 
breakage, subject to a temporal logic by which it moves from place to place. 
As the frame constantly breaks from its context, this self­breaking becomes 
part of the very definition.” (Butler 2009, 10)
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his dream” (Bateson 1972, 191). The dynamism of ludic mediality 
as a phenomenon of liminality has to be described as a mode of 
processuality in which suddenness is the key element in which 
game and play show their specific mediality. Suddenness as 
an expression and symbol of the non­identical and the discon­
tinuous in aesthetic modernity has been discussed prominently 
by Karl­Heinz Bohrer (1994). It is no coincidence that there are 
many connections to the notion of ludic mediality discussed 
here, because game, play and chance have been very important 
concepts for aesthetic modernity from Stéphane Mallarmé to sur­
realism to Marcel Duchamp and beyond, right up until today. It is 
this “dangerous” element of game and play that defines its allure. 
It is because of this that the mediation of paradoxes as the 
core element of ludic mediality only shows itself momentarily. 
Alice’s uncertainty and hesitation are just as brief as those of the 
player fighting Psycho Mantis in Metal Gear Solid. Shortly after 
these moments, the epistemic and logical borderlines between 
reality and fiction, actuality and virtuality, become stable again. 
Likewise, the experience of lucid dreaming is just a matter of 
seconds between dreaming and awakening. 
Bateson uses the analogy of the dream because it is his goal to 
describe game and play as a state of liminality that “mediates” 
between primary and secondary processes, realising their full 
transgressive potential in the process. At this point a connection 
between different categories is established that are, however, 
never fully compatible. “The message ‘This is play’ thus sets a 
frame of the sort which is likely to precipitate paradox: it is an 
attempt to discriminate between, or to draw a line between, cat­
egories of different logical types” (Bateson 1972, 195).
For Bateson the rule­regulated “game” is differentiated from the 
less restricted form of “play” by its higher level of complexity 
because in a game the problem of framing and the resulting 
paradoxes are reflected upon. In play the only rule results from 
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logico­epistemic uncertainty is driven by the question “Is this a 
game?” that is at the same time reflected upon by playing the 
game. Bateson as well as Niklas Luhmann’s concept of medium 
and form are based on the assumption that “meaning”6 is an 
effect of the processing of paradoxes. The famous paradox of 
Epimenides is a blue print for the kinds of paradoxes in question 
here.
This paradox results in a double­bind, an epistemic structure 
Bateson was interested in as a component of a theory of schiz­
ophrenia (his path to a theory of game and play led through 
mental illness, or at least what society deems as such). For 
Bateson, not being able to deal with simultaneous and con­
trary claims that cannot be true at the same time (according to 
the law of contradiction) is the very definition of the state of 
schizophrenia. A schizophrenic therefore loses his or her grip 
on reality because he or she cannot decide what is “real” and 
what is not, and as a result, his or her mind is stuck in a loop of 
recurring (im)possibilities. In games, however, Bateson discovers 
a dynamic, a process that while not able to eliminate the double­
bind, deals with it via temporal transgression. For Bateson, game 
and play had such a profound impact on the human mind that he 
was forced to conceptualise them as an evolutionary leap in the 
development of communication as a whole. The processing of 
paradoxes is fundamental for communication to go beyond the 
mere recognition of straight sensory signals. 
Only such “playful” communication is able to develop meta­com­
munications that can process double­binds and turn them into 
meaning. It is not hard to see what he had in mind, because 
without being able to somehow mediate between paradoxes, 
6 “Meaning” (Sinn) has to be understood in the sense that Luhmann gave 
the notion. In the perspective of his system theory “meaning” is in itself a 
medium that allows complex psychic and social systems to generate self 
reference and complexity. “Meaning” is therefore a prerequisite for complex 
systems as a whole. See Luhmann (1987, 92–148). 
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sign­usage, beyond strict denotation. Without understanding 
something to be true and false at the same time, we could not 
understand jokes, irony, metaphors or sarcasm. This is, of course, 
why the idea of an ideal language had to fail and it is of course no 
coincidence that Bateson was heavily influenced by Wittgenstein 
who began with a grandiose concept of an ideal language and 
arrived at a theory of games. 
Bateson uses the metaphor of “map and territory” to illus­
trate this in psychological terms using an old semiotic figure of 
thought.7 Paradoxes result from a confrontation of primary and 
secondary processes. Games in the sense of the question “Is this 
a game?” transcend the boundary between these two primordial 
psychological forces: “In primary process, map and territory are 
equated; in secondary process, they can be discriminated. In play, 
they are both equated and discriminated” (Bateson 1972, 191). This 
coincidentia oppositorum is perceived in brief, fleeting epiphanies 
of the logico­epistemic uncertainties mentioned above. Within 
the boundaries of the game the different layers are not mediated 
in the sense of a potential synthesis but as temporal successions 
that allow for a processing of the double­bind by means of time. 
As a side note, this idea of processing paradoxes is one of the 
integral parts of Niklas Luhmann’s theory, that was heavily 
influenced by the work of Bateson and Spencer­Brown. For Luh­
mann (as for Deleuze) paradoxes are not something that have 
to be eliminated in order to make something work but, on the 
contrary, are one of the most basic fundamentals of psychic 
and social systems. Luhmann borrows the notion of “re­entry” 
from the mathematician George Spencer­Brown. The term refers 
to an operation that enables a given system to reintegrate the 
basic differentiation that it, in itself, is based on, and to do so by 
7 Those connotations to the notion of “map and territory” that connect it with 
the history of colonialism have to be put aside in the context of this essay, 
since this would be a topic of its own that can’t be tackled in passing. 
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order” observer that, for Luhmann, is the epistemic hallmark of 
modernity.
This fluctuating dynamism is what ludic mediality is about, 
because the temporal processing is never linear but recursive. 
The ludic operations always tilt from one layer into the other, 
so that fixed moments “before” and “after” are established: 
paradoxes don’t get dissolved but stay in place while at the same 
time being processed without resulting in a stable synthesis. 
Ludic mediality always stays discrete, generating “meaning” as a 
result of the continuous processing of epistemic, logic and even 
ontological layers. Pathological modes of this dynamism (like 
schizophrenia) emerge at the exact moment when the psychic (or 
social) system is not able to walk this tightrope of ludic mediality 
anymore, when the paradoxes cannot be processed. 
Before any categorisation into genres like first-person shooters 
or adventure, it can be said that one of the constitutive 
fundamentals of many computer games and their ludic medi­
ality is a specific kind of self­reference, if not always as obvious 
as in Metal Gear Solid. It seems to be such a defining feature of 
many computer games that there is a clash or conflict between 
sophisticated techniques of immersion that try to establish 
“realistic”8 game worlds and inevitable moments of self­reference 
that point to the artificiality, the “non­reality”, of the game space. 
This struggle between conflicting aspects – which would be more 
precisely captured by the Heideggerian notion of Streit (strife), 
something I can’t get into here – is constitutive of a tension that is 
typical for computer games. On the one hand contemporary, big 
budget computer games still aim at hyper realistic graphics and 
immersive gameplay experiences that ideally make the player 
forget the artificiality of the game environment, on the other 
8 “Realism” in this case doesn’t necessarily refer to a kind of photorealistic 
simulation of reality but more to the creation of believable, virtual objects. 
See for this distinction Esposito (1978, 270).
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delicate balance of ludic mediality is always maintained, “total 
immersion”, meaning a complete perceptual illusion, is nothing 
but a phantasm of design theory. There is always a simultaneous 
closeness and distance to the world of the game because a game 
can only work because of this distance, while at the same time it 
has to be immersive enough to be believable. Accordingly, Steven 
Poole (2000, 77) wrote in his famous book Trigger Happy:
Counter­intuitively, it seems for the moment that the perfect 
videogame ‘feel’ requires the ever­increasing imaginative and 
physical involvement of the Player to stop somewhere short 
of full bodily immersion. After all, a sense of pleasurable con­
trol implies some modicum of separation: you are apart from 
what you are controlling.
It is important to note that this simultaneousness of external 
observation and intrinsic participation reveals one of the most 
distinctive characteristics of computer games, a character­
istic that gets overlooked as soon as one of the perspectives is 
privileged. It is because of this that Sybille Krämer insists upon 
the observation that this simultaneousness of perceptual and 
epistemic layers is a mode of perception unique to cyberspaces; a 
hypothesis aimed at a common rhetoric critical or media and the 
“dissolution of the real”, which I briefly mentioned earlier, when I 
referred to Baudrillard and Virillo:
Against the dogmatisation of just one perspective it has to 
be stressed that simulations of virtual realities presuppose 
that there is a difference between the space that a real body 
occupies and the virtual space of interaction. Cyberspace 
depends upon the difference between virtual reality and 
corporality in the outside world (Krämer 1998, 36; translation 
by the author).
It is no wonder that this fundamental difference is emphasised in 
computer games in ubiquitous instances of self­reference. One 
example is the save­function that is, of course, a characteristic 
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to start where he or she left off without having to start all over 
again. In many instances this save­function is not only triggered 
by discrete keyboard commands but is represented inside the 
diegetic world of the game. The ways in which these “save­
points” are represented in game are manifold and most of the 
time game designers try to integrate their appearances into the 
representational logic or design of the game in an attempt to 
preserve the immersion (which is unavoidable because using 
a save­point is in itself a meta­action that points beyond the 
diegetic world of the game). These save­points, which can take 
many forms – strange objects, books, typewriters or even sofas 
where the protagonist can sit down and relax – are conspicuous 
in the game world. They point to the artificiality of the game by 
not quite fitting “in the picture”. This is why such save­points have 
practically vanished. In the days of automatic, discrete saving 
or server client check­ups, save­points like those described are 
about to become a thing of the past. 
A different and quite popular form of self­referential deixis can 
be found in the use of MacGuffins: virtual objects with the sole 
purpose of being semiotic “blank spaces” in a pan­semiotic world 
where normally everything is semantically connected to “make 
sense” for the player. In Final Fantasy VII (1997), the player can find 
certain objects that, when inspected closely, reveal themselves 
to be miniature versions of the characters the player is inter­
acting with during the game. These little figurines are virtual 
objects “without meaning” because they are useless, that is, 
they are meaningless in regards to actual gameplay mechanics. 
They are just there, poking out of the virtual environment like a 
sore thumb. They can’t be used to fight, they are not part of any 
kind of puzzle or quest, they are just empty signifiers that point 
beyond themselves to a world outside of the game. Only the 
player can recognise their meaninglessness as such by aimlessly 
searching for the missing signified in a kind of parody of Derrida’s 
infinite semiosis. 
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have been tamed somewhat in recent years due to what can be 
called a “re­labourisation” of gaming. Since the introduction of 
platform “achievement systems” by Microsoft’s Xbox LIVE environ­
ment, computer games are littered with collectibles or little tasks 
that are unconnected to the game but that reward the player 
with completion tokens like trophies, badges or medals and give 
the tasks with a shallow sense of meaning. These meta­systems 
emphasise how little computer games (or shall we say most 
gamers?) can tolerate empty signifiers, how even the last anarchic 
traces of uncertainty must be tamed in order to satisfy our desire 
for meaning.
In a rundown part of a futuristic city in the classic PC role playing 
game (RPG), Anachronox (2001), the player encounters a non­
player character (NPC) whose sole purpose is to yell in the style 
of crazy apocalyptic visionaries and remind all passerby NPCs of 
their own digital artificiality. (“You are all not real! We exist within 
a computer game! Look, you are constantly uttering the same few 
sentences! You are all not real! We exist inside a computer game”.) 
Since those early days, references to onto­epistemic uncertainty 
are part of many computer games such as in the sophisticated 
narratives of the Metal Gear Solid series, Planescape Torment (1999), 
Deus Ex (2000) to name just a few examples, not to mention more 
recent games like Portal (2007) and Braid (2008) that put self­
reference at the core of their design concepts. 
In conclusion it can be established that games as a medium 
provide a certain kind of experience by allowing the simultaneous 
coexistence of otherwise incompatible layers, and this dynamic is 
amplified in computer games because of their medial foundations 
in digital media. Computer games, understood as a specific 
mode of the medium “game”, highlight this dynamic as the coex­
istence of closeness and distance, intrinsic actor and external 
observer. The resulting tension is the medium in which computer 
games are specific actualisations. In these actualisations, the 
paradoxical condition of their mediality is often shown in stagings 
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to, perhaps not without reason. But these paradoxical dynamics 
are only mirroring the human condition – the experience of 
being external observer and “embedded” participant, subject 
and object, at the same time, as phenomenology has told us 
from Husserl to Merleau­Ponty. This conflict can be experienced 
acutely in virtual environments and, of course, in computer 
games. 
Computer games are the most widely distributed form of virtual 
reality and, as interactive media, allow an actual integration of 
the perspective of the participant into the perspective of the 
observer and because of this, both an internal and external per­
spective of the interacting subject. This subject therefore is at the 
same time distant observer and involved actor. This involvement 
however gets aesthetically sublimated because the dangers of 
being “involved” get suspended like in lucid dreams.
A few closing remarks.
When I started working in game studies at the beginning of this 
century, the notion of gamification wouldn’t have been under­
stood as it is today. At that time gamification would have meant 
the dissolution of the real in favour of a postmodern “anything 
goes” conception of reality (as described earlier), perhaps 
synonymous with a term like “aesthetisation”. Although computer 
games already became a very large industry during the early 
twenty­first century, nobody would have been able to foresee 
the extent of pervasive gaming today. In the age of big data, 
geo­tagging and self­optimisation through “achievements” and 
“rankings”, game studies needs to consider a broader notion of 
what game­related fields of research may be, and that is exactly 
what is being done at the moment. In the past we loved to pose 
ontological questions, and for a long time game studies was 
expected to deliver definitions and thereby answer the questions 
“What is a game and what is its nature?”, But, at least for me, the 
more interesting way to approach this is to observe what kind of 
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thinking about the diversity of play is not just about different 
cultures and approaches to gaming but also about conceiving 
of ludic principles as a catalyst and prerequisite for thinking, 
feeling, understanding, creating understand worlds. The ubiquity 
of gamification (the application of game mechanics in non­game 
contexts), for example, allows us to differentiate at least three 
distinct layers that, in combination, constitute “games” as a 
specific mode of world apprehension.
1.  Self­optimisation
2.  Risk management
3.  Mediation of paradoxes
All of these elements can be utilised to enhance the human con­
dition ethically and aesthetically, as Kant, Schiller and Huizinga 
have argued, but at the same time they are used in the “games” of 
global capitalism where all of our lives are “at stake”. For Schiller, 
self­optimisation would have taken the form of a pedagogical 
system of playful education. In today’s work environments 
elements of gaming are often used as superficial gratification­
systems that mimic playful competition in order to make us work 
or consume more efficiently. Risk management is the only aspect 
of games that is relevant to the mathematical theory of games, 
which in turn is the basis for the market­predicting algorithms 
that global markets are based on. Standard & Poor’s, and other 
rating agencies, do nothing else but “play games” with our future 
and that is indeed a core ingredient of gaming itself. 
Games are all about predicting the future regardless of 
whether this future is immediate or a hundred years from now. 
Uncertainty is both at the core of what is fun about games, and 
the reason why mathematical game theory dominates economic 
theory today. It ’s all about living with contingency. The mediation 
of paradoxes seems to be the last remaining space of human 
freedom and the place where the arts, at last, come into their 
own. But this is just one side of the story. Making connections 
perceivable that would otherwise be unperceivable and risking 
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for games to work. By letting markets collapse and deliberately 
“raising the stakes” in the process, profits are maximised and 
wars are won. In an effort to conceptualise a truly interdis­
ciplinary approach to game studies that would bring all these 
aspects of gaming into the equation, we have to consider the 
notion that games are intrinsically humanist as a romantic one. 
We have to decide how to approach games as one of the great cul­
tural resources of humanity. Gaming and playing don’t mean pas­
sively embracing indifference. On the contrary, they are an active 
encounter with difference, and computer games, being digital 
media, especially allow us to practice navigating uncertainty. 
Historically, game studies and its subject, what I called ludic epis­
temology, are heirs to postmodernity in that they don’t play well 
with intellectual laziness and superficial relativism and especially 
not with essentialisms. Playing games is a way to be in contact 
with the world in a way that doesn’t allow for quick answers 
and handy definitions. It might be a mad world out there, but 
the dance of paradoxes is not just something to be feared, but 
something to be explored, and games as framed uncertainties 
allow just that. 
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